演化非线性过程系统的隐形传感器和执行器网络攻击处理

Henrique Oyama, Keshav Kasturi Rangan, Helen Durand
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引用次数: 10

摘要

对化学过程工业控制系统的网络攻击引起了人们的关注,人们担心它们会如何影响公司的财务、安全和生产水平。使用进程信息检测和处理网络攻击的一个关键的实际挑战是进程行为随着时间的推移而演变。可以想象,过程动态的变化可能会导致一些检测策略将动态的变化作为攻击,因为新数据与动态变化之前的数据相比显得异常。在这项工作中,我们利用几个案例研究来探讨当过程动态随时间变化时,网络攻击检测和处理策略的影响、好处和局限性。这项工作的目标是通过模拟研究来描述在过程演变不可避免的情况下,网络攻击检测和处理过程中可能需要和不需要的特征。我们展示了当过程动态发生变化时网络攻击检测所面临的挑战,并随后讨论处理攻击的两个概念,一个利用两层检测策略,当不清楚是否发生了攻击或过程动态发生了变化时触发模型重新识别,另一个是由执行器间隔注入控制信号。我们利用模拟来阐明这些策略的特征,并证明攻击处理方法的可验证性是其实现的关键(即,特别调优有可能留下攻击者可能定位和利用的漏洞)。*通讯作者:电话:+1 (313)577-3475;电子邮件:helen.durand@wayne.edu。预印本提交给先进制造与加工杂志,2021年8月27日
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Handling of stealthy sensor and actuator cyberattacks on evolving nonlinear process systems

Cyberattacks on control systems in the chemical process industries cause concern regarding how they can impact finances, safety, and production levels of companies. A key practical challenge for cyberattack detection and handling using process information is that process behavior evolves over time. Conceivably, changes in process dynamics might cause some detection strategies to flag a change in the dynamics as an attack due to the new data appearing abnormal compared to data from before the dynamics changed. In this work, we utilize several case studies to probe the question of what might be the impacts, benefits, and limitations of cyberattack detection and handling policies when the process dynamics change over time. The goal of this work is to characterize, through simulation studies, characteristics, which might be desirable and undesirable in cyberattack detection and handling procedures when process evolution is inevitable. We demonstrate challenges with cyberattack detection when process dynamics change and subsequently, discuss two concepts for handling attacks—one which utilizes a two-tier detection strategy in which model reidentification is triggered when it is not clear whether an attack or a change in the process dynamics has occurred, and one in which control signals are injected at intervals by the actuators. We utilize simulations to elucidate characteristics of these strategies and demonstrate that verifiability of attack-handling methods is key to their implementation (i.e., ad hoc tuning has potential to leave vulnerabilities which an attacker might locate and exploit).

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