内部人士在机构投资者在场的情况下进行的策略性交易

IF 2.1 2区经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Markets Pub Date : 2023-06-01 DOI:10.1016/j.finmar.2022.100802

Lai T. Hoang , Marvin Wee , Joey Wenling Yang

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引用次数: 2

摘要

我们研究了与机构交易者的信息交易竞争如何影响内幕交易。我们发现，当内部人士与机构在同一方交易时，他们完成交易的速度更快，而且当内部人士了解更多信息时，这种影响更为明显。这些发现支持基于信息的模型，表明内部人员加速了他们的交易，因为机构交易者可能会了解私人信息并与他们竞争。我们确定了机构投资者获取私人信息的两种可能渠道:当内部人士和机构交易员共用同一家经纪商时，以及当公司总部与机构交易员位于同一城市时。

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Strategic trading by insiders in the presence of institutional investors

We examine how competition to trade on information with institutional traders affects insider trading. We find insiders complete their trades quicker when trading on the same side as institutions, and this effect is more pronounced when insiders are more informed. These findings support information-based models, suggesting that insiders accelerate their trading as institutional traders are likely to become privy to the private information and compete with them. We identify two possible channels by which institutional investors acquire private information: when insiders and institutional traders share the same broker, and when firms’ headquarters are in the same city as institutional traders.

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial Markets BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

3.40

自引率

3.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Markets publishes high quality original research on applied and theoretical issues related to securities trading and pricing. Area of coverage includes the analysis and design of trading mechanisms, optimal order placement strategies, the role of information in securities markets, financial intermediation as it relates to securities investments - for example, the structure of brokerage and mutual fund industries, and analyses of short and long run horizon price behaviour. The journal strives to maintain a balance between theoretical and empirical work, and aims to provide prompt and constructive reviews to paper submitters.