基于信誉值的分布式能源消费P2P交易方法

IF 1.9 Q4 ENERGY & FUELS
Jiang Tao , Hua Ting , Xiao Hao , Fu Linbo , Pei Wei , Ma Tengfei
{"title":"基于信誉值的分布式能源消费P2P交易方法","authors":"Jiang Tao ,&nbsp;Hua Ting ,&nbsp;Xiao Hao ,&nbsp;Fu Linbo ,&nbsp;Pei Wei ,&nbsp;Ma Tengfei","doi":"10.1016/j.gloei.2023.06.005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Adding a reputation incentive system to peer-to-peer (P2P) energy transactions can encourage prosumers to regulate their trading behavior, which is important for ensuring the efficiency and reliability of P2P transactions. This study proposed a P2P transaction mechanism and game optimization model for prosumers involved in distributed energy sources considering reputation-value incentives. First, the deviation of P2P transactions and the non-consumption rate of distributed renewable energy in P2P transactions were established as indicators to quantify the influencing factors of the reputation value, and a reputation incentive model of P2P transactions for prosumers was constructed. Then, the penalty coefficient was applied to the cost function of the prosumers, and a non-cooperative game model of P2P transactions based on the complete information of multi-prosumers was established. Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium problem was transformed into a nonlinear optimization problem by constructing the modified optimal reaction function, and the Nash equilibrium solution of the game was obtained via a relaxation algorithm. Finally, the modified IEEE 33-node test system based on electricity market P2P and an IEEE 123-node test system were used to analyze and verify the cost and P2P participation of prosumers considering the reputation value. The results show that the addition of the reputation incentive system can encourage prosumers to standardize their interactive transaction behavior and actively participate in P2P transactions. It can also improve the operation efficiency of the power grid and promote the perfection of the P2P transaction mechanism.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":36174,"journal":{"name":"Global Energy Interconnection","volume":"6 3","pages":"Pages 308-323"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"P2P transaction method for distributed energy prosumers based on reputation value\",\"authors\":\"Jiang Tao ,&nbsp;Hua Ting ,&nbsp;Xiao Hao ,&nbsp;Fu Linbo ,&nbsp;Pei Wei ,&nbsp;Ma Tengfei\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.gloei.2023.06.005\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Adding a reputation incentive system to peer-to-peer (P2P) energy transactions can encourage prosumers to regulate their trading behavior, which is important for ensuring the efficiency and reliability of P2P transactions. This study proposed a P2P transaction mechanism and game optimization model for prosumers involved in distributed energy sources considering reputation-value incentives. First, the deviation of P2P transactions and the non-consumption rate of distributed renewable energy in P2P transactions were established as indicators to quantify the influencing factors of the reputation value, and a reputation incentive model of P2P transactions for prosumers was constructed. Then, the penalty coefficient was applied to the cost function of the prosumers, and a non-cooperative game model of P2P transactions based on the complete information of multi-prosumers was established. Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium problem was transformed into a nonlinear optimization problem by constructing the modified optimal reaction function, and the Nash equilibrium solution of the game was obtained via a relaxation algorithm. Finally, the modified IEEE 33-node test system based on electricity market P2P and an IEEE 123-node test system were used to analyze and verify the cost and P2P participation of prosumers considering the reputation value. The results show that the addition of the reputation incentive system can encourage prosumers to standardize their interactive transaction behavior and actively participate in P2P transactions. It can also improve the operation efficiency of the power grid and promote the perfection of the P2P transaction mechanism.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":36174,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Global Energy Interconnection\",\"volume\":\"6 3\",\"pages\":\"Pages 308-323\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Global Energy Interconnection\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1087\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2096511723000488\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ENERGY & FUELS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Global Energy Interconnection","FirstCategoryId":"1087","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2096511723000488","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ENERGY & FUELS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

在P2P能源交易中加入声誉激励机制,可以激励产消者规范自己的交易行为,这对保证P2P交易的效率和可靠性具有重要意义。本文提出了一种考虑声誉-价值激励的分布式能源生产消费者P2P交易机制和博弈优化模型。首先,将P2P交易偏差和分布式可再生能源在P2P交易中的非消耗率作为指标,量化声誉价值的影响因素,构建P2P交易对产消者的声誉激励模型。然后,将惩罚系数应用于产消者的成本函数,建立了基于多产消者完全信息的P2P交易非合作博弈模型。通过构造修正的最优反应函数,将纳什均衡问题转化为非线性优化问题,并通过松弛算法得到博弈的纳什均衡解。最后,采用改进的基于电力市场P2P的IEEE 33节点测试系统和IEEE 123节点测试系统对考虑信誉价值的产消者的成本和P2P参与进行了分析和验证。结果表明,声誉激励制度的加入能够促使产消者规范其互动交易行为,积极参与P2P交易。还可以提高电网的运行效率,促进P2P交易机制的完善。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
P2P transaction method for distributed energy prosumers based on reputation value

Adding a reputation incentive system to peer-to-peer (P2P) energy transactions can encourage prosumers to regulate their trading behavior, which is important for ensuring the efficiency and reliability of P2P transactions. This study proposed a P2P transaction mechanism and game optimization model for prosumers involved in distributed energy sources considering reputation-value incentives. First, the deviation of P2P transactions and the non-consumption rate of distributed renewable energy in P2P transactions were established as indicators to quantify the influencing factors of the reputation value, and a reputation incentive model of P2P transactions for prosumers was constructed. Then, the penalty coefficient was applied to the cost function of the prosumers, and a non-cooperative game model of P2P transactions based on the complete information of multi-prosumers was established. Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium problem was transformed into a nonlinear optimization problem by constructing the modified optimal reaction function, and the Nash equilibrium solution of the game was obtained via a relaxation algorithm. Finally, the modified IEEE 33-node test system based on electricity market P2P and an IEEE 123-node test system were used to analyze and verify the cost and P2P participation of prosumers considering the reputation value. The results show that the addition of the reputation incentive system can encourage prosumers to standardize their interactive transaction behavior and actively participate in P2P transactions. It can also improve the operation efficiency of the power grid and promote the perfection of the P2P transaction mechanism.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Global Energy Interconnection
Global Energy Interconnection Engineering-Automotive Engineering
CiteScore
5.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
985
审稿时长
15 weeks
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信