供养利维坦:政治竞争和软预算约束。来自阿根廷国家以下地区的证据

IF 0.6 Q4 ECONOMICS

Investigaciones Regionales-Journal of Regional Research Pub Date : 2022-05-09 DOI:10.38191/iirr-jorr.22.006

Osvaldo Meloni

{"title":"供养利维坦:政治竞争和软预算约束。来自阿根廷国家以下地区的证据","authors":"Osvaldo Meloni","doi":"10.38191/iirr-jorr.22.006","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents evidence of the influence of political competition on the behavior of fiscal policy in Argentine provinces from 1987 to 2015. Contrary to the predominant theory and empirical evidence from subnational districts my estimations of a dynamic panel data show that political competition is associated with increases in public outlays and changes in its composition. This finding is strongly related to the large vertical fiscal imbalances that characterize the Argentine fiscal federalism. I conjecture that governors use the additional low-cost spending power given by federal transfers to feed clientelistic networks, increase public employment and direct subsidies to constituencies, thus enhancing their chances to remain in office.","PeriodicalId":44893,"journal":{"name":"Investigaciones Regionales-Journal of Regional Research","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6000,"publicationDate":"2022-05-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Feeding the Leviathan: political competition and soft budget constraints. Evidence from Argentine subnational districts\",\"authors\":\"Osvaldo Meloni\",\"doi\":\"10.38191/iirr-jorr.22.006\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper presents evidence of the influence of political competition on the behavior of fiscal policy in Argentine provinces from 1987 to 2015. Contrary to the predominant theory and empirical evidence from subnational districts my estimations of a dynamic panel data show that political competition is associated with increases in public outlays and changes in its composition. This finding is strongly related to the large vertical fiscal imbalances that characterize the Argentine fiscal federalism. I conjecture that governors use the additional low-cost spending power given by federal transfers to feed clientelistic networks, increase public employment and direct subsidies to constituencies, thus enhancing their chances to remain in office.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44893,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Investigaciones Regionales-Journal of Regional Research\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-05-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Investigaciones Regionales-Journal of Regional Research\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.38191/iirr-jorr.22.006\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Investigaciones Regionales-Journal of Regional Research","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.38191/iirr-jorr.22.006","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

本文提供了1987年至2015年政治竞争对阿根廷各省财政政策行为影响的证据。与主要理论和来自国家以下地区的经验证据相反，我对动态面板数据的估计表明，政治竞争与公共支出的增加及其组成的变化有关。这一发现与阿根廷财政联邦制的巨大纵向财政失衡密切相关。我猜想，州长们会利用联邦转移支付所带来的额外低成本支出能力来养活客户网络，增加公共就业和对选区的直接补贴，从而增加他们留任的机会。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Feeding the Leviathan: political competition and soft budget constraints. Evidence from Argentine subnational districts

This paper presents evidence of the influence of political competition on the behavior of fiscal policy in Argentine provinces from 1987 to 2015. Contrary to the predominant theory and empirical evidence from subnational districts my estimations of a dynamic panel data show that political competition is associated with increases in public outlays and changes in its composition. This finding is strongly related to the large vertical fiscal imbalances that characterize the Argentine fiscal federalism. I conjecture that governors use the additional low-cost spending power given by federal transfers to feed clientelistic networks, increase public employment and direct subsidies to constituencies, thus enhancing their chances to remain in office.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Investigaciones Regionales-Journal of Regional Research ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.80

自引率

22.20%

发文量

审稿时长

30 weeks

期刊介绍： La revista Investigaciones Regionales nace con el objeto de abrir un nuevo cauce a la publicación de los resultados de los estudios relativos a los temas regionales, tanto en España como en otros países europeos y latinoamericanos Se ha creado con el apoyo de la Asociación Española de Ciencia Regional, cuya actual Junta Directiva incluyó este proyecto entre los compromisos a cumplir durante su mandato. La Revista tendrá, sin embargo, independencia en todo cuanto se refiere a sus contenidos y a su orientación científica, cuya responsabilidad recaerá plenamente en el Director y el Consejo de Redacción.