{"title":"独裁者什么时候可以独当一面?威权体制中的个性化与监督","authors":"Andrew Leber, Christopher Carothers, M. Reichert","doi":"10.1177/00323292221078661","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Why are some autocrats able to personalize power within their regimes while others are not? Past studies have focused on the balance of power between the autocrat and his or her supporting coalition of peer or subordinate elites, but we find that often the crucial relationship is between the autocrat and the “old guard”—retired leaders, party elders, and other elites of the outgoing generation. Using an original data set of authoritarian leadership transitions, we argue that when members of the old guard retain oversight capacity over their incoming successor, he or she is less likely to overturn power-sharing arrangements and consolidate individual power. We illustrate this argument with a case study of three leadership transitions in China between 1989 and 2012. This study’s findings advance our understanding of elite politics and intergenerational conflict in authoritarian regimes.","PeriodicalId":47847,"journal":{"name":"Politics & Society","volume":"51 1","pages":"66 - 107"},"PeriodicalIF":4.1000,"publicationDate":"2022-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"When Can Dictators Go It Alone? Personalization and Oversight in Authoritarian Regimes\",\"authors\":\"Andrew Leber, Christopher Carothers, M. Reichert\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/00323292221078661\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Why are some autocrats able to personalize power within their regimes while others are not? Past studies have focused on the balance of power between the autocrat and his or her supporting coalition of peer or subordinate elites, but we find that often the crucial relationship is between the autocrat and the “old guard”—retired leaders, party elders, and other elites of the outgoing generation. Using an original data set of authoritarian leadership transitions, we argue that when members of the old guard retain oversight capacity over their incoming successor, he or she is less likely to overturn power-sharing arrangements and consolidate individual power. We illustrate this argument with a case study of three leadership transitions in China between 1989 and 2012. This study’s findings advance our understanding of elite politics and intergenerational conflict in authoritarian regimes.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47847,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Politics & Society\",\"volume\":\"51 1\",\"pages\":\"66 - 107\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-03-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Politics & Society\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292221078661\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"POLITICAL SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Politics & Society","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292221078661","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
When Can Dictators Go It Alone? Personalization and Oversight in Authoritarian Regimes
Why are some autocrats able to personalize power within their regimes while others are not? Past studies have focused on the balance of power between the autocrat and his or her supporting coalition of peer or subordinate elites, but we find that often the crucial relationship is between the autocrat and the “old guard”—retired leaders, party elders, and other elites of the outgoing generation. Using an original data set of authoritarian leadership transitions, we argue that when members of the old guard retain oversight capacity over their incoming successor, he or she is less likely to overturn power-sharing arrangements and consolidate individual power. We illustrate this argument with a case study of three leadership transitions in China between 1989 and 2012. This study’s findings advance our understanding of elite politics and intergenerational conflict in authoritarian regimes.
期刊介绍:
Politics & Society is a peer-reviewed journal. All submitted papers are read by a rotating editorial board member. If a paper is deemed potentially publishable, it is sent to another board member, who, if agreeing that it is potentially publishable, sends it to a third board member. If and only if all three agree, the paper is sent to the entire editorial board for consideration at board meetings. The editorial board meets three times a year, and the board members who are present (usually between 9 and 14) make decisions through a deliberative process that also considers written reports from absent members. Unlike many journals which rely on 1–3 individual blind referee reports and a single editor with final say, the peers who decide whether to accept submitted work are thus the full editorial board of the journal, comprised of scholars from various disciplines, who discuss papers openly, with author names known, at meetings. Editors are required to disclose potential conflicts of interest when evaluating manuscripts and to recuse themselves from voting if such a potential exists.