Military security obstacles to decolonizing the Chagos: A reply to Harris

For a remote series of small atolls in the center of the Indian Ocean, the Chagos Archipelago plays an outsized role in international affairs and is generating considerable contention among members of the international community. While Britain is steadfast in its assertion of sovereignty over the Archipelago, Mauritius is relentless in its challenge – with most of the world’s backing – and, the Chagossians continue to organize and agitate to return to the Chagos regardless of the landlord. Meanwhile, the United States, the party which derives the most direct benefit from the Archipelago – via its military base on Diego Garcia – is the silent benefactor. For decades the United States has deferred to Britain on matters related to the Chagos dispute, delegating Britain to hold at bay the scorn of Mauritius and the international community. While this strategy has afforded the U.S. virtually unfettered access to Diego Garcia, the political and diplomatic costs are now mounting, and a there is a legitimate debate taking place regarding the United States’ stance on the issue. Do the military and security benefits to supporting British sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago for the U.S. outweigh the political and diplomatic costs? Would the United States be better served by Mauritius or the United Kingdom as landlord of Diego Garcia? I welcome and thank Dr Peter Harris for his considered and thought-provoking response to my 2020 Journal of the Indian Ocean Region research article entitledMauritian sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago? Strategic implications for Diego Garcia from a UKUS perspective (Bashfield, 2020). My article argues that Mauritian sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago would adversely affect U.S. power projection capabilities from Diego Garcia due to questions over the long-term political ‘reliability’ of Mauritius versus the United Kingdom, the degree of oversight Port Louis may enforce regarding military activities, the application of the Pelindaba Treaty, and Archipelago resettlement. Harris’ response, entitled The Case for Decolonizing the Chagos Archipelago: A Response to Bashfield argues twofold: that while the above mentioned points are valid, these considerations should not be overstated; and that when viewed in a broader frame, various political and diplomatic considerations my analysis omitted make a compelling case that decolonizing the Chagos, and restoring sovereignty to Mauritius, is in the U.S. strategic