生物防御与大国竞争的回归

Q2 Social Sciences
G. Epstein
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要《2017年美国国家安全战略》声称,“在被视为上个世纪的一种现象后,大国竞争又回来了”,指出俄罗斯和中国为重申其影响力并试图改变国际秩序而采取的行动。这种转变对生物防御有影响。这表明,各国开发和潜在使用生物武器的可能性增加,而那些更关心非国家生物武器计划的人却淡化了这一点。国家项目获得专业知识、设施和资源意味着比通常认为的非国家行为者更先进的技术水平,影响了国家生物防御项目检测、表征、应对和归因生物攻击的要求。各国也可能有不同于恐怖分子意图的生物武器任务。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Biodefense and the return to great-power competition
ABSTRACT The 2017 US National Security Strategy asserts that, “after being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned,” pointing to actions that Russia and China have taken to reassert their influence and attempt to change the international order. Such a shift has implications for biodefense. It suggests an increased likelihood of the development and potential use of biological weapons by states, which had been downplayed by those who have been more concerned about non-state biological-weapons programs. State program access to expertise, facilities, and resources implies a greater level of technological sophistication than would typically be credited to non-state actors, influencing the requirements for national biodefense programs to detect, characterize, respond, to, and attribute a biological attack. States also could have missions for biological weapons that differ from those intended by terrorists.
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来源期刊
Nonproliferation Review
Nonproliferation Review Social Sciences-Political Science and International Relations
CiteScore
0.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
13
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