首席财务官薪酬凸性、风险承担和公司对冲

IF 2.1 3区经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

European Financial Management Pub Date : 2023-08-24 DOI:10.1111/eufm.12455

Massimiliano Barbi, Valentina Febo, Irene Massimiliani

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们利用2009年至2019年手工收集的美国石油和天然气公司样本的企业套期保值和管理薪酬数据，研究了首席财务官的风险承担激励措施如何影响企业套期保值。CFO股权薪酬的相对凸性对套期保值的可能性和程度产生负面影响。当首席财务官和首席执行官具有不同的风险承担激励时，首席财务官的股权回报的相对凸性高于首席执行官。这一证据强调了首席财务官在指导公司对冲策略方面的主要作用。

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CFO pay convexity, risk taking and corporate hedging

We study how a CFO's risk-taking incentives affect corporate hedging by utilising hand-collected data from 2009 to 2019 on corporate hedging and managerial compensation for a sample of US oil and gas firms. The relative convexity of CFO equity compensation negatively affects the likelihood and extent of hedging. When the CFO and CEO have diverging risk-taking incentives, the relative convexity of the CFO's equity payoff prevails over that of the CEO. This evidence underscores the primary role of the CFO in steering a firm's hedging strategy.

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来源期刊

European Financial Management BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

4.30

自引率

18.20%

发文量

期刊介绍： European Financial Management publishes the best research from around the world, providing a forum for both academics and practitioners concerned with the financial management of modern corporation and financial institutions. The journal publishes signficant new finance research on timely issues and highlights key trends in Europe in a clear and accessible way, with articles covering international research and practice that have direct or indirect bearing on Europe.