你好,平台治理;但公司治理永远不会结束

IF 0.5 Q3 LAW
Qiang (John) Cai
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引用次数: 0

摘要

不断增长的平台创新可能是革命性的和有益的,它影响了构成平台治理文献关注焦点的监管问题。本文首次讨论了公司治理在支撑平台治理方面的重要作用。具体来说,利益相关者视角为平台治理和公司治理的化学结合提供了催化剂。虽然利益相关者理论并非没有批评,但网络平台的特点为该理论在平台背景下提供了额外的支持。本文确定了通过公司治理引导平台治理的几个主要机制,即董事会代表的信息能力;独立董事;利益相关者委员会。相反,一项经济分析表明,具有投票能力的董事会代表不适合平台治理的目的。作为一种“尖锐的格言”,本文还挑战了一种观点,即源于传统工业资本主义的公司治理可能会阻碍平台创新,而平台创新属于现代经济的范式。研究表明,即使在这种传统的、股东导向的公司治理结构中,公司治理也提供了一个有利于创业和创新的制度框架。因此,平台经济的新时代凸显而不是否定了公司治理的重要性。平台治理,网络平台,公司治理,利益相关者理论,股东至上
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Hello Platform Governance; But Never Ending Corporate Governance
Revolutionary and beneficial as it may be, the ever-increasing platform innovation effectuates regulatory issues that constitute a focal concern of the literature on platform governance. This article discusses, for the first time, the instrumental role of corporate governance in underpinning platform governance. Specifically, a stakeholder perspective provides a catalyst for the chemical combination of platform governance and corporate governance. While the stakeholder theory is not without criticism, the characteristics of online platforms lend extra support to the theory in the platform context. The article identifies several major mechanisms for channelling platform governance through corporate governance, i.e., board representation in an information capacity; independent directors; and stakeholder committees. In contrast, an economic analysis suggests that board representation in a voting capacity is not appropriate for the purpose of platform governance. As an ‘obiter dictum’, this article also challenges a position that corporate governance, which arose from traditional industrial capitalism, may impede platform innovation, which falls within the paradigm of the modern economy. It is demonstrated that corporate governance even in this traditional, shareholder-oriented formation provides an institutional framework that is conducive to entrepreneurship and innovation. Therefore, the new era of the platform economy highlights, rather than negates, the significance of corporate governance. Platform governance, online platform, corporate governance, stakeholder theory, shareholder primacy
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来源期刊
自引率
33.30%
发文量
23
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