{"title":"许多人的难题","authors":"J. Simon","doi":"10.1111/PHPE.12100","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A problem of the many Fs arises in cases where intuitively there is precisely one F, but when you look closely you find many candidates for being that F, each one apparently as well-qualified as the next. The problem arises for mundane things like rocks, houses, and coins. It also arises for entities that present special philosophical challenges, like persons and experiencers. In this essay, I present a new argument that the problem of the many experiencers is an especially hard problem of the many, and that property dualism — the view that properties that there is something it is like to instantiate are irreducible — may be the best way to solve it. The argument given here turns primar-ily on normative (i.e., moral) considerations, and is independent of existing arguments for property dualism such as the conceivability and knowledge arguments. It is also independent of existing arguments deriving metaphysical conclusions from the problem of the many experiencers (or related problems of the many), such as those in Unger (2004) and Zimmerman (2010).","PeriodicalId":51519,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Perspectives","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2017-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHPE.12100","citationCount":"8","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"THE HARD PROBLEM OF THE MANY\",\"authors\":\"J. Simon\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/PHPE.12100\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"A problem of the many Fs arises in cases where intuitively there is precisely one F, but when you look closely you find many candidates for being that F, each one apparently as well-qualified as the next. The problem arises for mundane things like rocks, houses, and coins. It also arises for entities that present special philosophical challenges, like persons and experiencers. In this essay, I present a new argument that the problem of the many experiencers is an especially hard problem of the many, and that property dualism — the view that properties that there is something it is like to instantiate are irreducible — may be the best way to solve it. The argument given here turns primar-ily on normative (i.e., moral) considerations, and is independent of existing arguments for property dualism such as the conceivability and knowledge arguments. It is also independent of existing arguments deriving metaphysical conclusions from the problem of the many experiencers (or related problems of the many), such as those in Unger (2004) and Zimmerman (2010).\",\"PeriodicalId\":51519,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophical Perspectives\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/PHPE.12100\",\"citationCount\":\"8\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophical Perspectives\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPE.12100\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophical Perspectives","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/PHPE.12100","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
A problem of the many Fs arises in cases where intuitively there is precisely one F, but when you look closely you find many candidates for being that F, each one apparently as well-qualified as the next. The problem arises for mundane things like rocks, houses, and coins. It also arises for entities that present special philosophical challenges, like persons and experiencers. In this essay, I present a new argument that the problem of the many experiencers is an especially hard problem of the many, and that property dualism — the view that properties that there is something it is like to instantiate are irreducible — may be the best way to solve it. The argument given here turns primar-ily on normative (i.e., moral) considerations, and is independent of existing arguments for property dualism such as the conceivability and knowledge arguments. It is also independent of existing arguments deriving metaphysical conclusions from the problem of the many experiencers (or related problems of the many), such as those in Unger (2004) and Zimmerman (2010).