公正治理和公正社会习俗背景下的作用和权利

IF 0.6 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
S. Golden
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引用次数: 0

摘要

谁保护个人自由和人的尊严不受国家、公民社会或个人的支配,这是中国和西方都在争论的问题,不是从自由主义的角度出发,而是从“关系”的角度出发。自由主义假定个人是衡量这些问题的尺度,但这里的“个人”是一个抽象概念。关系假定社会关系是衡量这些事物的尺度。人不是抽象的东西。他们结合了几个不同的社会“角色”,每个角色包括义务和权利。这些角色限制了个人的行动自由。没有单一个人的社会。自由主义也将权利视为一种抽象概念:“人人生而平等”。关系将权利置于相互承认权利和责任的背景下。权利只有在事实上可以行使时才存在。因此,从关系的观点来看,一个人行使其权利的能力必须根据正义的概念来看待,必须有一个机构能够保证这种正义,即行使这些权利,同时保证履行社会义务。这是国家的角色吗?公民社会?市场?为了在跨文化背景下真正讨论这些问题,我们需要寻找共同点,而不是把古典自由主义对个人的看法视为“不言而喻”。理解中国“响应式威权主义”概念的潜在政治哲学并不意味着赞同它。但是,理解这一思想及其后果确实为放大谁保护个人自由和人的尊严这一基本问题提供了空间。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Roles and rights in the context of just governance and just social mores
Who protects individual liberties and human dignity from domination by the State, by Civil Society or by individuals is a question under debate in China as well as the West, not from the point of view of Liberalism, but from the point of view of ‘Relationality’. Liberalism posits the individual as the measure of these matters but the ‘individual’ in question is an abstraction. Relationality posits social relations as the measure of these matters. Persons are not abstractions. They combine several different social ‘roles’, and each role includes obligations as well as rights. These roles limit the individual’s freedom of action. There are no unipersonal societies. Liberalism also posits rights as an abstraction: ‘All men are created equal’. Relationality posits rights in a context of mutual recognition of rights and responsibilities. Rights only exist if they can in fact be exercised. From the point of view of Relationality, therefore, a person’s ability to exercise her or his rights must be seen in the light of a concept of Justice and there must be an agency that can guarantee this Justice, the exercise of these rights, while it guarantees the fulfilment of social obligations. Is this the role of the State? of Civil Society? of the Market? To truly discuss these matters in a transcultural context, we would need to look for common ground, not take as ‘self-evident’ the classical Liberal perception of the individual. Understanding the underlying political philosophy of China’s concept of ‘responsive authoritarianism’ does not mean endorsing it. But understanding this idea and its ramifications does provide room for amplifying the basic question of who protects individual liberties and human dignity.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
105
期刊介绍: In modern industrial society reason cannot be separated from practical life. At their interface a critical attitude is forged. Philosophy & Social Criticism wishes to foster this attitude through the publication of essays in philosophy and politics, philosophy and social theory, socio-economic thought, critique of science, theory and praxis. We provide a forum for open scholarly discussion of these issues from a critical-historical point of view. Philosophy & Social Criticism presents an international range of theory and critique, emphasizing the contribution of continental scholarship as it affects major contemporary debates.
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