“加拿大境内或境外”:《宪章》对加拿大安全情报局域外活动的适用

IF 0.7 4区 社会学 Q2 LAW
Leah West
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引用次数: 0

摘要

自2015年《反恐怖主义法》迅速通过以来,加拿大安全情报局(CSIS)拥有前所未有且极具争议的权力,可以采取“合理和相称”的措施来减少对加拿大安全的威胁。虽然加拿大安全情报局可以采取的措施类型有一些限制,但《加拿大安全情报机构法》允许使用违反加拿大法律或限制《加拿大权利与自由宪章》保护的权利的措施,只要这些措施得到联邦法院的司法授权。随着新的威胁在世界各地激增,预计CSIS将越来越多地在海外执行这一任务。然而,负责监督CSIS使用减少威胁措施的审查机构报告称,CSIS从未寻求司法授权进行减少威胁措施。为什么?一个答案可能是,CSIS得出的结论是,《宪章》不管辖在国外进行的行动,因此,他们的域外行为超出了联邦法院的管辖范围和监督范围。《宪章》是否适用于加拿大战略情报局的海外行为,表面上取决于加拿大最高法院关于《宪章》域外适用的主要案件R.v Hape。本文对国内法、国际法以及情报法理论进行了研究,以解释为什么这种推定是错误的。这是错误的,尤其是因为大多数人对Hape的意见在分析和适用国际法方面存在严重缺陷。但同时,由于情报行动与哈佩有争议的跨国刑事调查截然不同,法院的调查结果不适用于前者。简言之,这篇文章表明,将Hape应用于CSIS官员的行为不仅使他们的行为超出了加拿大法院的审查范围,而且还造成了严重的人权差距。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
‘Within Or Outside Canada’: The Charter’s Application To The Extraterritorial Activities Of The Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Since the swift passage of the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2015, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has had the unprecedented and highly controversial authority to take ‘reasonable and proportionate’ measures to reduce threats to Canadian security. While there are some limits to the types of measures CSIS can employ, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act permits the use of measures that would otherwise contravene the laws of Canada or limit a right protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms so long as they are judicially authorized by the Federal Court. As new threats proliferate around the world, it is anticipated that CSIS will increasingly carry out this mandate overseas. Yet review bodies tasked with monitoring CSIS’s use of threat reduction measures (TRMs) report that CSIS has never sought judicial authorization to conduct a TRM. Why? One answer may be that CSIS has concluded that the Charter does not govern actions carried out abroad, and, as such, their extraterritorial conduct falls beyond the reach and oversight of the Federal Court. Whether the Charter applies to CSIS’s overseas conduct ostensibly lies in the Supreme Court of Canada’s leading case on the extraterritorial application of the Charter, R. v Hape. This article canvasses domestic and international law, as well as intelligence law theory, to explain why that presumption is wrong. Wrong, not least because the majority opinion in Hape is deeply flawed in its analysis and application of international law. But also, because intelligence operations are so distinguishable from the transnational criminal investigations at issue in Hape, the Court’s findings are inapplicable in the former context. In short, this article demonstrates that applying Hape to the actions of CSIS officers not only leaves their actions beyond the scrutiny of Canadian courts but also creates a significant human rights gap.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
16.70%
发文量
26
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