自动循环中的对手网络物理防御计划

IF 2 Q3 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS
Sandeep Banik, Thiagarajan Ramachandran, A. Bhattacharya, S. D. Bopardikar
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引用次数: 0

摘要

由于网络和物理组件的紧密集成和操作复杂性,网络物理系统(CPS)的安全性继续带来新的挑战。为了应对这些挑战,本文提出了一种领域感知、基于优化的方法,以自动方式确定CPS的有效防御策略——通过模拟循环中利用系统漏洞、CPS互连和物理组件动态的战略对手。我们的方法建立在基于马尔可夫决策过程(MDP)的对抗性决策模型之上,该模型确定了CPS攻击图上的最佳网络(离散)和物理(连续)攻击行为。防御计划问题被建模为对手和防御者之间的非零和博弈。我们使用无模型强化学习方法来解决作为防御策略函数的对手问题。然后,我们使用贝叶斯优化(BO)来为防御者找到近似的最佳响应,以针对由此产生的对手策略强化网络。这个过程被重复多次,以改进两个参与者的策略。我们在一个受勒索软件启发的图上展示了我们的方法的有效性,该图以智能建筑系统为物理过程。数值研究表明,对于网络强化的各种防御者特定成本,我们的方法收敛于纳什均衡。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Automated Adversary-in-the-Loop Cyber-Physical Defense Planning
Security of cyber-physical systems (CPS) continues to pose new challenges due to the tight integration and operational complexity of the cyber and physical components. To address these challenges, this article presents a domain-aware, optimization-based approach to determine an effective defense strategy for CPS in an automated fashion—by emulating a strategic adversary in the loop that exploits system vulnerabilities, interconnection of the CPS, and the dynamics of the physical components. Our approach builds on an adversarial decision-making model based on a Markov Decision Process (MDP) that determines the optimal cyber (discrete) and physical (continuous) attack actions over a CPS attack graph. The defense planning problem is modeled as a non-zero-sum game between the adversary and defender. We use a model-free reinforcement learning method to solve the adversary’s problem as a function of the defense strategy. We then employ Bayesian optimization (BO) to find an approximate best-response for the defender to harden the network against the resulting adversary policy. This process is iterated multiple times to improve the strategy for both players. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on a ransomware-inspired graph with a smart building system as the physical process. Numerical studies show that our method converges to a Nash equilibrium for various defender-specific costs of network hardening.
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来源期刊
ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems
ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS-
CiteScore
5.70
自引率
4.30%
发文量
40
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