{"title":"谁控制多边发展融资?","authors":"Rebecca Ray","doi":"10.1163/19426720-02701006","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Multilateral development banks (MDB s) are a growing source of development finance, with nearly two trillion dollars in assets. They have developed a wide array of governance structures, with implications for the distribution of members’ control over those assets. This paper measures that power distribution in 28 MDB s using Penrose-Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices and members’ relative voting power on MDB governance boards. It uses these calculations to create a typology of MDB governance structures: creditor-led MDB s distribute power among non-borrowers, core borrower-led MDB s distribute power among a few central borrowers, and mutual aid-oriented MDB s distribute power among a wide group of borrowers. Finally, it explores the impact of the creation of two new MDB s, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank, and finds that while they do not dramatically alter the global landscape they do allow significantly greater access to capital for some borrowers.","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2021-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Who Controls Multilateral Development Finance?\",\"authors\":\"Rebecca Ray\",\"doi\":\"10.1163/19426720-02701006\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n Multilateral development banks (MDB s) are a growing source of development finance, with nearly two trillion dollars in assets. They have developed a wide array of governance structures, with implications for the distribution of members’ control over those assets. This paper measures that power distribution in 28 MDB s using Penrose-Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices and members’ relative voting power on MDB governance boards. It uses these calculations to create a typology of MDB governance structures: creditor-led MDB s distribute power among non-borrowers, core borrower-led MDB s distribute power among a few central borrowers, and mutual aid-oriented MDB s distribute power among a wide group of borrowers. Finally, it explores the impact of the creation of two new MDB s, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank, and finds that while they do not dramatically alter the global landscape they do allow significantly greater access to capital for some borrowers.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47262,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Global Governance\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-02-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Global Governance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02701006\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Global Governance","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02701006","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
多边开发银行(MDB )是一个日益增长的发展融资来源,拥有近2万亿美元的资产。它们已经形成了一系列广泛的治理结构,对成员对这些资产的控制权的分配产生了影响。本文使用Penrose-Banzhaf和Shapley-Shubik权力指数和成员在MDB治理委员会的相对投票权来衡量28个MDB 中的权力分配。它利用这些计算创建了多边开发银行治理结构的类型:债权人主导的多边开发银行 在非借款人中分配权力,核心借款人主导的多边开发银行 在少数中心借款人中分配权力,以互助为导向的多边开发银行 在广泛的借款人群体中分配权力。最后,报告探讨了亚洲基础设施投资银行(aiib)和新开发银行(new Development Bank)这两个新成立的多边开发银行 的影响,发现它们虽然没有显著改变全球格局,但确实大大增加了一些借款人获得资本的机会。
Multilateral development banks (MDB s) are a growing source of development finance, with nearly two trillion dollars in assets. They have developed a wide array of governance structures, with implications for the distribution of members’ control over those assets. This paper measures that power distribution in 28 MDB s using Penrose-Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices and members’ relative voting power on MDB governance boards. It uses these calculations to create a typology of MDB governance structures: creditor-led MDB s distribute power among non-borrowers, core borrower-led MDB s distribute power among a few central borrowers, and mutual aid-oriented MDB s distribute power among a wide group of borrowers. Finally, it explores the impact of the creation of two new MDB s, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank, and finds that while they do not dramatically alter the global landscape they do allow significantly greater access to capital for some borrowers.