Vibrant Theory

Gavin Lucas and Chris Witmore pose the question of what a commitment to theory means in the absence of ‘paradigms.’ We take up their question and seek to engage with and critique the answer that they offer, focusing on three interrelated areas: first, their characterization of ‘strong’ vs. ‘weak’ theory; second, their move to elevate an object-centred approach as a corrective to earlier ‘top-down’ modes of interpretation; third, their discussion of relevance as an emergent process. We close with some thoughts of our own about the future of theory in archaeology. In the spirit of a ‘hermeneutics of generosity’ (Preucel 2021), we seek to engage in a productive dialogue where we take their ideas seriously and offer our own perspectives that are strongly coloured by our commitment to pragmatism and our interest in semiotics. Lucas and Witmore begin by reflecting upon the disunification of the field over the past two decades. They suggest that while theory may not be ‘dead’ (Bintliff and Pearce 2011, Thomas 2015), there seems to be an end to the era of grand theories that sought to synthesize knowledge under a single, overarching paradigm. Sceptical of arguments for new paradigms (e.g. Kristiansen 2014), they make the case that we have entered a phase where concepts and ideas such as gender, agency, and materiality are supplanting approaches such as Marxism, structuralism, processualism, and postprocessualism. They regard this theoretical pluralism as paradigm driven in the sense that it relies on models, patterns, and precedent and seek to challenge us to think more deeply about the work that theory does. They then make a distinction between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ theory (borrowing from Sedgwick 1997). Strong theory, they argue, is characterized by ‘all those – isms and ologies’ we teach our undergraduate students. It is heavy-handed and acts to place things in readymade boxes as a way of satisfying a priori ideas. They assert that for far too long, archaeologists have relied on paradigmatic strong theories to make ‘mute stones speak.’ They advocate instead for weak theory, an approach that ‘hesitates in the face of things and even sets out on a different path should the situation deem it.’ Pétursdóttir and Olsen (2018, p. 105), whom they cite, characterize weak theory as a theory ‘that replaces suspicion and paranoia with trust and affinity, and as a result becomes vulnerable and mutable.’ While it is true that much ‘strong’ theory can be limiting and proscriptive (e.g. selectionism), we do not see how their understanding of ‘weak theory’ improves upon the approaches advocated by many archaeologists over the past three decades. Indeed, these earlier approaches whether they be characterized as ‘hermeneutics’ (Hodder 1991), ‘tacking back and forth’ (Wylie 1989), or ‘semiosis’ (Preucel and Bauer 2001), all recognize the act of interpretation as provisional, open-ended, and