小型模块化反应堆和先进反应堆安全:通过设计整合物理和网络安全以抵御恶意行为和不断演变的威胁的监管视角

Q4 Social Sciences
Raphael Duguay
{"title":"小型模块化反应堆和先进反应堆安全:通过设计整合物理和网络安全以抵御恶意行为和不断演变的威胁的监管视角","authors":"Raphael Duguay","doi":"10.7290/ijns070102","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"How can future nuclear technologies and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) deter and prevent organized crime groups, terrorists, and malicious actors from attempting to steal or sabotage nuclear materials and facilities? This paper presents the benefits of integrating Security by Design (SeBD) into a regulatory framework to allow more a flexible and effective design of physical protection systems for SMRs. During its effort to modernize the Nuclear Security Regulations, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) licensing application process provides for the option of SeBD in moving toward a performancebased approach with less prescriptive requirements. CNSC also recognizes the need for a graded approach using risk-informed criteria for nuclear security. As part of the SMR Vendor Design Review 1 Duguay: Small Modular Reactors Security by Design to Protect Against Malicious Acts and Evolving Threats International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol.7, No.1, 2020 doi:10.7290/ijns070102 (VDR) process, CNSC reviews SeBD proposals as well as interfaces with safety (robustness), safeguards (Nuclear Material Accounting and Control), operations, and sustainability. The CNSC also recognizes the need to share relevant, nuclear, sensitive information from the National Design Basis Threat (DBT) with SMR designers so they can consider credible and evolving threats in their proposed SeBD. Finally, the interfaces between nuclear security and system engineering specialists within the VDR process allow one to look at both physical and cyber security systems in a more holistic approach. This allows the regulator to look at how SMR developers propose to optimize nuclear safety to mitigate or protect against potential acts of sabotage and radiological release. SeBD offers opportunities to reduce costs for new nuclear facilities. However, it is not a “silver bullet.” SeBD needs to be integrated as part of an overall security strategy taking into consideration essential security policies, facility characteristics, the materials used, and the national threat/DBT. In addition, there are other relevant security challenges to address, such as remote facilities without readily available off-site response capabilities, the concept of building unmanned/remotely operated nuclear facilities, ever evolving cyber security threats, over-reliance on digital technologies, the use of lethal force by autonomous and remotely operated security systems, or protecting floating (e.g., offshore) or transportable SMRs. Some of these SMR designs being considered are for future use, but now is the time to address some complex issues and legal/ethical questions that may shape the reality of future generations.","PeriodicalId":36043,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Nuclear Security","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Small Modular Reactors and Advanced Reactor Security: Regulatory Perspectives on Integrating Physical and Cyber Security by Design to Protect Against Malicious Acts and Evolving Threats\",\"authors\":\"Raphael Duguay\",\"doi\":\"10.7290/ijns070102\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"How can future nuclear technologies and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) deter and prevent organized crime groups, terrorists, and malicious actors from attempting to steal or sabotage nuclear materials and facilities? This paper presents the benefits of integrating Security by Design (SeBD) into a regulatory framework to allow more a flexible and effective design of physical protection systems for SMRs. During its effort to modernize the Nuclear Security Regulations, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) licensing application process provides for the option of SeBD in moving toward a performancebased approach with less prescriptive requirements. CNSC also recognizes the need for a graded approach using risk-informed criteria for nuclear security. As part of the SMR Vendor Design Review 1 Duguay: Small Modular Reactors Security by Design to Protect Against Malicious Acts and Evolving Threats International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol.7, No.1, 2020 doi:10.7290/ijns070102 (VDR) process, CNSC reviews SeBD proposals as well as interfaces with safety (robustness), safeguards (Nuclear Material Accounting and Control), operations, and sustainability. The CNSC also recognizes the need to share relevant, nuclear, sensitive information from the National Design Basis Threat (DBT) with SMR designers so they can consider credible and evolving threats in their proposed SeBD. Finally, the interfaces between nuclear security and system engineering specialists within the VDR process allow one to look at both physical and cyber security systems in a more holistic approach. This allows the regulator to look at how SMR developers propose to optimize nuclear safety to mitigate or protect against potential acts of sabotage and radiological release. SeBD offers opportunities to reduce costs for new nuclear facilities. However, it is not a “silver bullet.” SeBD needs to be integrated as part of an overall security strategy taking into consideration essential security policies, facility characteristics, the materials used, and the national threat/DBT. In addition, there are other relevant security challenges to address, such as remote facilities without readily available off-site response capabilities, the concept of building unmanned/remotely operated nuclear facilities, ever evolving cyber security threats, over-reliance on digital technologies, the use of lethal force by autonomous and remotely operated security systems, or protecting floating (e.g., offshore) or transportable SMRs. Some of these SMR designs being considered are for future use, but now is the time to address some complex issues and legal/ethical questions that may shape the reality of future generations.\",\"PeriodicalId\":36043,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Nuclear Security\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Nuclear Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.7290/ijns070102\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"Social Sciences\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Nuclear Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7290/ijns070102","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

未来的核技术和小型模块化反应堆如何阻止和防止有组织犯罪集团、恐怖分子和恶意行为者试图窃取或破坏核材料和核设施?本文介绍了将设计安全(SeBD)集成到监管框架中的好处,以允许更灵活和有效地设计smr的物理保护系统。在努力实现核安全法规现代化的过程中,加拿大核安全委员会(CNSC)的许可申请流程为SeBD提供了一个选择,即转向基于性能的方法,减少规范性要求。国家核安全委员会还认识到,需要采用风险知情标准对核安全进行分级处理。作为SMR供应商设计审查1 Duguay的一部分:小型模块化反应堆的安全设计,以防止恶意行为和不断变化的威胁国际核安全杂志,Vol.7, No.1, 2020 doi:10.7290/ijns070102 (VDR)过程,CNSC审查SeBD提案以及安全(鲁棒性),保障(核材料会计和控制),运营和可持续性的接口。CNSC还认识到有必要与SMR设计者分享来自国家设计基础威胁(DBT)的相关核敏感信息,以便他们能够在拟议的SeBD中考虑可信的和不断发展的威胁。最后,在VDR过程中,核安全和系统工程专家之间的接口允许人们以更全面的方法来看待物理和网络安全系统。这使得监管机构可以研究SMR开发商如何提出优化核安全的建议,以减轻或防止潜在的破坏行为和辐射释放。SeBD为降低新核设施的成本提供了机会。然而,它并不是“银弹”。SeBD需要集成为整体安全战略的一部分,考虑到基本安全策略、设施特征、使用的材料和国家威胁/DBT。此外,还有其他相关的安全挑战需要解决,例如,没有现成的场外响应能力的远程设施,建设无人/远程操作核设施的概念,不断发展的网络安全威胁,对数字技术的过度依赖,自主和远程操作安全系统使用致命武力,或保护浮动(例如海上)或可运输的小型反应堆。目前正在考虑的一些小型反应堆设计是为将来使用的,但现在是时候解决一些复杂的问题和法律/伦理问题,这些问题可能会影响未来几代人的现实。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Small Modular Reactors and Advanced Reactor Security: Regulatory Perspectives on Integrating Physical and Cyber Security by Design to Protect Against Malicious Acts and Evolving Threats
How can future nuclear technologies and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) deter and prevent organized crime groups, terrorists, and malicious actors from attempting to steal or sabotage nuclear materials and facilities? This paper presents the benefits of integrating Security by Design (SeBD) into a regulatory framework to allow more a flexible and effective design of physical protection systems for SMRs. During its effort to modernize the Nuclear Security Regulations, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) licensing application process provides for the option of SeBD in moving toward a performancebased approach with less prescriptive requirements. CNSC also recognizes the need for a graded approach using risk-informed criteria for nuclear security. As part of the SMR Vendor Design Review 1 Duguay: Small Modular Reactors Security by Design to Protect Against Malicious Acts and Evolving Threats International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol.7, No.1, 2020 doi:10.7290/ijns070102 (VDR) process, CNSC reviews SeBD proposals as well as interfaces with safety (robustness), safeguards (Nuclear Material Accounting and Control), operations, and sustainability. The CNSC also recognizes the need to share relevant, nuclear, sensitive information from the National Design Basis Threat (DBT) with SMR designers so they can consider credible and evolving threats in their proposed SeBD. Finally, the interfaces between nuclear security and system engineering specialists within the VDR process allow one to look at both physical and cyber security systems in a more holistic approach. This allows the regulator to look at how SMR developers propose to optimize nuclear safety to mitigate or protect against potential acts of sabotage and radiological release. SeBD offers opportunities to reduce costs for new nuclear facilities. However, it is not a “silver bullet.” SeBD needs to be integrated as part of an overall security strategy taking into consideration essential security policies, facility characteristics, the materials used, and the national threat/DBT. In addition, there are other relevant security challenges to address, such as remote facilities without readily available off-site response capabilities, the concept of building unmanned/remotely operated nuclear facilities, ever evolving cyber security threats, over-reliance on digital technologies, the use of lethal force by autonomous and remotely operated security systems, or protecting floating (e.g., offshore) or transportable SMRs. Some of these SMR designs being considered are for future use, but now is the time to address some complex issues and legal/ethical questions that may shape the reality of future generations.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
International Journal of Nuclear Security
International Journal of Nuclear Security Social Sciences-Safety Research
CiteScore
0.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
审稿时长
8 weeks
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信