谎言、该死的谎言和基准:受托人的障碍

IF 0.6 Q4 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Richard M. Ennis
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引用次数: 0

摘要

大多数机构投资者,如公共养老基金和捐赠基金,使用有偏见的基准来报告他们的业绩。这些基准指数是向下倾斜的,这意味着它们的回报往往低于机构投资组合所显示的市场敞口和风险的公平回报。两种基金类型的重要样本显示,基准偏差在每年1.4至1.7个百分点之间。这种偏见使得这两种类型的基金中的绝大多数报告表现优于他们选择的基准,而实际上,大多数基金的表现远远落后于适当的被动管理基准。基准偏差掩盖了机构基金管理中严重的代理问题。例如,基金员工和顾问有强烈的动机为复杂、昂贵、多资产类别的投资组合辩护,而他们自己就是这些投资组合的基准。受托人可能觉得他们别无选择,只能接受工作人员和顾问的基准和报告,但这只会使问题长期存在。至少,投资受托人应该加强对基准和业绩报告的控制。因为他们是负责看守守望者的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Lies, Damn Lies, and Benchmarks: An Injunction for Trustees
Most institutional investors, such as public pension funds and endowments, report their performance using biased benchmarks. The benchmarks are biased downwardly, meaning their returns tend to be less than a fair return for the market exposures and risk exhibited by the institutions’ portfolios. Significant samples of both fund types exhibit benchmark bias in the range of 1.4 to 1.7 percentage points per year. This bias enables a sizable majority of both types of funds to report outperforming their chosen benchmarks when, in fact, most underperform an appropriate passive-management benchmark by a wide margin. Benchmark bias masks serious agency problems in the management of institutional funds. For example, fund staff and consultants have strong incentives to justify complex, costly, multi-asset-class portfolios, for which they themselves are the benchmarkers. Trustees may feel they have no choice but to accept the benchmarking and reporting by staff and consultants, but this only perpetuates the problem. At the very least, investment trustees should step up and take control of benchmarking and performance reporting. For they are the ones charged with watching the watchmen.
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来源期刊
Journal of Investing
Journal of Investing BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
16.70%
发文量
42
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