问责制和学习与积极的代理人

IF 0.6 4区 社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE
T. Yu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

是否应该向正在学习正确政策以实现其目标的组织引入问责制?我开发了一个代理模型,重点关注问责制和代理人内在动机之间的互动。代理人的更多努力会带来更多信息的政策结果,从而更好地学习政策。让代理人对政策结果负责会激励代理人,从而改进政策学习。然而,由于在政策失败时将代理人免职,从而剥夺了他在失败中学习的利益,问责制也阻碍了代理人的积极性。当内在动机较高时,这种负面影响更为显著。因此,委托人避免对更有内在动机的代理人追究责任。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Accountability and learning with motivated agents
Should accountability be introduced to organizations that are learning about the right policies to achieve their goals? I develop an agency model focusing on the interactions between accountability and an agent’s intrinsic motivation. More effort by the agent leads to more informative policy outcomes and thereby better policy learning. Holding the agent accountable for the policy outcomes motivates the agent and thus improves policy learning. However, by removing the agent from office upon policy failure and thereby taking away his benefit from learning through failure, accountability also discourages the agent. This negative effect is more substantial when the intrinsic motivation is higher. The principal, therefore, refrains from using accountability on the agent who is more intrinsically motivated.
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来源期刊
Journal of Theoretical Politics
Journal of Theoretical Politics POLITICAL SCIENCE-
CiteScore
2.10
自引率
10.00%
发文量
19
期刊介绍: The Journal of Theoretical Politics is an international journal one of whose principal aims is to foster the development of theory in the study of political processes. It provides a forum for the publication of original papers seeking to make genuinely theoretical contributions to the study of politics. The journal includes rigorous analytical articles on a range of theoretical topics. In particular, it focuses on new theoretical work which is broadly accessible to social scientists and contributes to our understanding of political processes. It also includes original syntheses of recent theoretical developments in diverse fields.
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