法庭包装的责任

IF 0.8 Q2 LAW
M. J. Nelson, A. Driscoll
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引用次数: 2

摘要

公众如何回应法院的打包企图?长期以来,公众对法院的支持表明,选民会对那些试图操纵备受尊敬的法院的现任法官进行报复。然而,现任者可能会战略性地用官僚主义的术语来描述他们的努力,以尽量减少公众的强烈抗议,或者利用法庭打包提案来激活党派支持基础。根据一系列调查实验,我们证明,战略政治家可以通过用非政治语言表达法院改革提案来最大限度地减少选举反弹,而制度合法性的屏蔽效应在共同的党派偏见面前消失了。这些结果为雄心勃勃的政客们如何避免让司法机构屈从于他们意愿的选举后果提供了新的线索。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Accountability for Court Packing
How does the public respond to court-packing attempts? Longstanding accounts of public support for courts suggest voters retaliate against incumbents who seek to manipulate well-respected courts. Yet incumbents might strategically frame their efforts in bureaucratic terms to minimize the public’s outcry or use court-packing proposals to activate a partisan base of support. Drawing on a series of survey experiments, we demonstrate that strategic politicians can minimize electoral backlash by couching court reform proposals in apolitical language, and institutional legitimacy’s shielding effect dissolves in the face of shared partisanship. These results shed new light on how ambitious politicians might avoid electoral consequences for efforts to bend the judiciary to their will.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
16
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