告别“近似真理”?

IF 0.1 Q4 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
P. Kyle Stanford
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引用次数: 12

摘要

最常见的是,关于科学现实主义的争论被视为分裂了一些人,他们认为至少我们最好的科学理论在经验和实践上的显著成功表明,这些理论很有可能是“近似正确的”。但我想说的是,这种对辩论的描述早已过时。它不仅模糊了当代两种截然不同类型的科学现实主义之间的核心差异,而且更重要的是,它掩盖了这两种现实主义与那些认为科学探究的历史记录本身表明这种现实主义在任何一种形式下都站不住脚的人之间的最重要的实际分歧。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Fond Farewell to "Approximate Truth"?
Most commonly, the scientific realism debate is seen as dividing those who do and do not think that the striking empirical and practical successes of at least our best scientific theories indicate with high probability that those theories are ‘approximately true’. But I want to suggest that this characterization of the debate has far outlived its usefulness. Not only does it obscure the central differences between two profoundly different types of contemporary scientific realist, but even more importantly it serves to disguise the most substantial points of actual disagreement between these two kinds of realists and those who instead think the historical record of scientific inquiry itself reveals that such realism is untenable in either form.
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