{"title":"回顾《凡尔赛条约》的14种方式†","authors":"Dino Kritsiotis","doi":"10.1093/lril/lraa017","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n This article examines the idea of the Treaty of Versailles as a readily quantifiable corpus of provisions as set down in a readily identifiable document that was signed at the Palace of Versailles on 28 June 1919. It does so by recalling the pre-history to that peace that stretches as far back as US President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points of January 1918, for the German Government accepted these Fourteen Points as well as subsequent pronouncements of President Wilson as the basis for the peace that ended the Great War. Through a close engagement with diplomatic correspondence from October and November 1918, the article considers how impressions came to form that a ‘contract’ had been made with the enemy (John Maynard Keynes) by the time of the Armistice of Compiègne of November 1918—an apparent ‘charter for our future activity’ (Harold Nicolson) or a localized lex pacificatoria for its time. The article explores the amenability of each of the Fourteen Points to international normativity and, in its final section, it provides a broader account of how this set of positions shaped Germany’s official response to the draft treaty (‘Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace’) that was released in May 1919.","PeriodicalId":43782,"journal":{"name":"London Review of International Law","volume":"8 1","pages":"43-88"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2020-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Fourteen ways of looking back at the Treaty of Versailles†\",\"authors\":\"Dino Kritsiotis\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/lril/lraa017\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n This article examines the idea of the Treaty of Versailles as a readily quantifiable corpus of provisions as set down in a readily identifiable document that was signed at the Palace of Versailles on 28 June 1919. It does so by recalling the pre-history to that peace that stretches as far back as US President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points of January 1918, for the German Government accepted these Fourteen Points as well as subsequent pronouncements of President Wilson as the basis for the peace that ended the Great War. Through a close engagement with diplomatic correspondence from October and November 1918, the article considers how impressions came to form that a ‘contract’ had been made with the enemy (John Maynard Keynes) by the time of the Armistice of Compiègne of November 1918—an apparent ‘charter for our future activity’ (Harold Nicolson) or a localized lex pacificatoria for its time. The article explores the amenability of each of the Fourteen Points to international normativity and, in its final section, it provides a broader account of how this set of positions shaped Germany’s official response to the draft treaty (‘Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace’) that was released in May 1919.\",\"PeriodicalId\":43782,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"London Review of International Law\",\"volume\":\"8 1\",\"pages\":\"43-88\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"London Review of International Law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/lril/lraa017\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"London Review of International Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/lril/lraa017","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
本文考察了《凡尔赛条约》作为1919年6月28日在凡尔赛宫签署的一份易于识别的文件中规定的易于量化的条款的概念。这是通过回顾1918年1月美国总统伍德罗·威尔逊(Woodrow Wilson)的十四点和平的历史来实现的,因为德国政府接受了这十四点以及随后威尔逊总统的声明,作为结束一战的和平的基础。通过与1918年10月和11月的外交信函的密切接触,本文考虑了在1918年11月的《compi停战协定》(Armistice of compi)时,与敌人(约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯)达成“合同”的印象是如何形成的——这显然是“我们未来活动的宪章”(哈罗德·尼科尔森),或者是当时的局部和平法。文章探讨了“十四点原则”对国际规范的适应性,并在最后一节更广泛地阐述了这一系列立场如何影响了德国对1919年5月发布的条约草案(“德国代表团对和平条件的意见”)的官方回应。
Fourteen ways of looking back at the Treaty of Versailles†
This article examines the idea of the Treaty of Versailles as a readily quantifiable corpus of provisions as set down in a readily identifiable document that was signed at the Palace of Versailles on 28 June 1919. It does so by recalling the pre-history to that peace that stretches as far back as US President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points of January 1918, for the German Government accepted these Fourteen Points as well as subsequent pronouncements of President Wilson as the basis for the peace that ended the Great War. Through a close engagement with diplomatic correspondence from October and November 1918, the article considers how impressions came to form that a ‘contract’ had been made with the enemy (John Maynard Keynes) by the time of the Armistice of Compiègne of November 1918—an apparent ‘charter for our future activity’ (Harold Nicolson) or a localized lex pacificatoria for its time. The article explores the amenability of each of the Fourteen Points to international normativity and, in its final section, it provides a broader account of how this set of positions shaped Germany’s official response to the draft treaty (‘Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace’) that was released in May 1919.