Do bank regulations matter for financial stability? Evidence from a developing economy

Purpose This paper aims to establish the effect of bank regulations on financial stability in Kenya. Specifically, the study seeks to uncover the effect of micro and macro prudential regulations on financial stability and their trade-offs or complementarities. Design/methodology/approach Using annual time series data over the period 1990–2017, the study uses structural equation model (SEM) estimation technique. This solves the problem of approximating measurement errors, using both latent constructs and indicator constructs. Findings Study findings reveal that macro and micro prudential regulations are significant drivers of financial stability. Further, prudential regulations are more effective when they complement each other. Research limitations/implications This study centers on how bank regulations affect financial stability. Future research could be carried out on the effect of Non-Bank Financial Institutions regulations on financial system stability. Practical implications Complementing macro and micro prudential regulation is more effective and efficient in ensuring stability of the financial system other than letting the two policy objectives operate independently. Social implications Regulatory authorities should introduce prudential regulations that would encourage innovations in the banking sector. This ensures easy deposit mobilization that enhances financial inclusion. Prudential regulations that ensure financial stability will be effective when low income earners are included in the financial system. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the role of banking regulations on financial stability. This study is also pioneering in the use of SEM estimation technique, in examining how prudential regulations affect financial stability. Previous cross-country studies have focused on macro prudential regulations ignoring the importance of micro prudential regulations.