具有代理和外部性连续体的交换经济的弱混合均衡

IF 0.3 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2023-02-13 DOI:10.1515/bejte-2021-0098

Zhe Yang

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引用次数: 0

摘要

[摘要]灵感来自赵，J. 1996。具有外部性的交换经济中的混合均衡与核心选择。李建军。2011.中国经济增长的实证分析。“具有连续玩家的正常形式的游戏的弱核心。”王晓明，2017.中国经济发展的宏观调控。“关于具有连续玩家的正常形式游戏的核心。”杨震。2020。数学社会科学89:32-42。“具有参与者连续体和伪效用的交换经济的弱α-核”。杨志和，张晓明。2021。“具有无序偏好和连续体的博弈的弱α核存在定理”。摘要:本文建立了一个具有外部性和连续体的交换经济。在此模型中定义了弱混合均衡，并证明了正则条件下的存在性定理。在此基础上，分析了无外部性且具有连续体的交换经济中，混合均衡集与竞争均衡集之间的关系。

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The Weak Hybrid Equilibria of an Exchange Economy with a Continuum of Agents and Externalities

Abstract Inspired by Zhao, J. 1996. “The Hybrid Equilibria and Core Selection in Exchange Economies with Externalities.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 26 (4): 387–407, Askoura, Y. 2011. “The Weak-Core of a Game in Normal Form with a Continuum of Players.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 47: 43–7, Askoura, Y. 2017. “On the Core of Normal Form Games with a Continuum of Players.” Mathematical Social Sciences 89: 32–42, Yang, Z. 2020. “The Weak α-core of Exchange Economies with a Continuum of Players and Pseudo-utilities.” Journal of Mathematical Economies 91: 43–50 and Yang, Z., and X. Zhang. 2021. “A Weak α-core Existence Theorem of Games with Nonordered Preferences and a Continuum of Agents.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 94: 102464, we establish an exchange economy with externalities and a continuum of agents. We define the weak hybrid equilibrium in this model and prove the existence theorem under the regular conditions. Furthermore, we analyze the relation between the set of hybrid equilibria and the set of competitive equilibria in an exchange economy without externalities and with a continuum of agents.

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来源期刊

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

25.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： We welcome submissions in all areas of economic theory, both applied theory and \"pure\" theory. Contributions can be either innovations in economic theory or rigorous new applications of existing theory. Pure theory papers include, but are by no means limited to, those in behavioral economics and decision theory, game theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of economic mechanisms. Applications could encompass, but are by no means limited to, contract theory, public finance, financial economics, industrial organization, law and economics, and labor economics.