A Case Against Simple-mindedness: Śrīgupta on Mental Mereology

There ’ s a common line of reasoning which supposes that the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is grounded in a mind-like simple subject. To the contrary, M ā dhyamika Buddhist philosophers beginning with Ś r ī gupta (seventh – eighth century) argue that any kind of mental simple is incoherent and thus metaphysically impossible. Lacking any unifying principle, the phenomenal unity of conscious experience is instead an unfounded illusion. In this paper, I present an analysis of Ś r ī gupta ’ s ‘ neither-one-nor-many argument ’ against mental simples and show how his line of reasoning is driven by a set of implicit questions concerning the nature of and relation between consciousness and its intentional object. These questions not only set the agenda for centuries of intra-Buddhist debate on the topic, but they are also questions to which any defender of uni fi ed consciousness or a simple subject of experience arguably owes responses.