G.E.摩尔关于概念与判断

IF 0.5 0 PHILOSOPHY

Analisis Filosofico Pub Date : 2021-05-01 DOI:10.36446/AF.2021.357

José Sebastián Briceño Domínguez

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在《审判的本质》（1899）中，G.E.Moore为这一奇怪的论点辩护，根据这一论点，“似乎有必要……将世界视为由概念形成的”。哲学家们对这一提议提出了不同的理解，特别是对摩尔概念的真实含义。在这篇文章中，我讨论并拒绝了其中的三个：一是根据摩尔概念是具体细节的丛理论框架内的普遍性（Nelson，1962；鲍德温，1990）；第二种观点认为，摩尔人的概念是表面分析框架内的细节（Bell，1999）；第三种，根据摩尔概念是一个独特的类别，源于他所谓的拒绝物质（特定）/属性（普遍）区别（MacBride，2018）。最后，我为自己的理解辩护，这突出了年轻的G.E.摩尔公开的柏拉图主义立场。

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G. E. Moore on Concepts and Judgment

In “The Nature of Judgment” (1899), G. E. Moore defends the strange thesis according to which “[i]t seems necessary… to regard the world as formed of concepts”. Philosophers have offered distinct understandings of this proposal, in particular of what Moorean concepts really are. In this article I discuss and reject three of them: one, according to which Moorean concepts are universals within the framework of a bundle theory of concrete particulars (Nelson, 1962; Baldwin, 1990); a second one, according to which Moorean concepts are particulars within a mereological framework of analysis (Bell, 1999); and a third one, according to which Moorean concepts are a sui generis category, resulting from his alleged rejection of the substance (particular)/attribute (universal) distinction (MacBride, 2018). I end by defending my own understanding, which highlights the openly Platonic stance of the young G. E. Moore.

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来源期刊

Analisis Filosofico PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

15 weeks

期刊介绍： Análisis Filosófico is an open access scientific journal issued by the Argentine Society of Philosophical Analysis (SADAF). Since 1981, it offers original and unpublished papers on theoretical and practical philosophy, discussions, critical studies and reviews –in Spanish, English and Portuguese– that contribute to the development of philosophical analysis. Essential conditions for publication are conceptual accuracy, precision and novelty. Its refereeing policy is based on double-blind reviews and external assessment. It is launched twice a year on May and November.