Antitrust Regulation Disputes on Horizontal Shareholding: A Comparative Analysis Between China and the United States and Its Implications

Horizontal shareholding refers to the behavior of operators acting as investors, holding partial shares in two or more companies with competitive relationships in the same relevant market. The antitrust law and economic studies concerning this behavior have emerged as a new area of focus in developed market economies, represented by the United States, and in the traditional antitrust law field in recent years. The United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have held hearings on the antitrust issues behind horizontal shareholding. Influential antitrust law and economics scholars such as Hovenkamp have joined the discussion, and fierce debates continue. This article first systematically sorts out the basis, principles, and methods of antitrust regulation of horizontal shareholding behavior, and compares the rules and value orientations of antitrust regulation of horizontal shareholding behavior between China and the United States, and finally provides some suggestions for possible antitrust regulation of horizontal shareholding behavior in China in the future.