集装箱运输链的纵向整合是否导致横向串通?

IF 3.7 3区 工程技术 Q2 TRANSPORTATION
Gang Dong, Jin Li
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引用次数: 2

摘要

随着全球化背景下国际贸易运输模式合作与一体化的推进,集装箱运输链条上的两个关键环节——集装箱港口与班轮之间的纵向一体化往往导致集装箱港口之间的横向串通。本文通过建立一个具有离散时间周期的无限重复博弈,探讨了垂直整合与水平共谋共存的相互关系、可能性和稳定性。我们的主要发现是纵向整合和横向串通具有相辅相成的作用。特别是,前者导致托运人的盈余增加,而牺牲了后者。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Does vertical integration lead to horizontal collusion in container transport chains?
ABSTRACT With the promotion of mode cooperation and integration in international trade transport in the context of intense globalization, vertical integration between container ports and liners, two key players in container transport chains, often leads to horizontal collusion between container ports. By establishing an infinitely repeated game with discrete time periods, this paper explores the interrelation, the possibility and the stability of the coexistence between vertical integration and horizontal collusion. Our primary finding is that vertical integration and horizontal collusion have mutually reinforcing effects. In particular, the former results in an increase in shippers’ surplus at the expense of the latter.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.20
自引率
8.60%
发文量
66
期刊介绍: Thirty years ago maritime management decisions were taken on the basis of experience and hunch. Today, the experience is augmented by expert analysis and informed by research findings. Maritime Policy & Management provides the latest findings and analyses, and the opportunity for exchanging views through its Comment Section. A multi-disciplinary and international refereed journal, it brings together papers on the different topics that concern the maritime industry. Emphasis is placed on business, organizational, economic, sociolegal and management topics at port, community, shipping company and shipboard levels. The Journal also provides details of conferences and book reviews.
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