新扫帚扫得干净吗？新首席执行官在银行业“大洗澡”的证据

IF 1.2 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Emerging Market Finance Pub Date : 2019-03-28 DOI:10.1177/0972652719831543

Chung-Hua Shen, Chien-An Wang

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引用次数: 1

摘要

本研究调查了在首席执行官（CEO）离职期间，提供贷款损失和贷款冲销是否存在重大变化。提供贷款损失被称为“收益大浴”，提供贷款冲销被称为是“资产质量大浴”。我们将CEO离职分为三种类型，即私营银行的强制和自愿CEO离职、国有银行的离职和并购结果的离职。基于台湾商业银行的数据，我们发现强制任命的首席执行官在收益和资产质量方面表现出巨大的差异，而自愿任命的首席首席执行官则表现出收益和资产品质的巨大差异。与POB的CEO更替相比，GOB任命的CEO在收益或资产质量方面都没有大的变化。此外，并购导致的失误并不会带来大的损失。JEL分类：C23、G21、G28、M41、M48

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Do New Brooms Sweep Clean? Evidence that New CEOs Take a ‘Big Bath’ in the Banking Industry

This study investigates whether significant changes exist in providing loan losses and loan charge-offs during turnovers of chief executive officers (CEOs). Providing loan losses is referred to as a ‘big bath in earnings’, and providing loan charge-offs is referred to as a ‘big bath in asset quality’. We classify CEO turnovers into three types, namely, forced and voluntary CEO turnovers in privately owned banks (POB), turnovers in government-owned banks (GOB) and turnovers as outcomes of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Using findings based on the data of Taiwanese commercial banks, we demonstrate that the forcibly appointed CEOs exhibit big baths in earnings and asset quality, whereas the voluntarily appointed CEOs exhibit a big bath in earnings but not in asset quality. Compared with the CEO turnover in a POB, the appointed CEO in a GOB shows no big bath in either earnings or asset quality. Moreover, turnovers resulting from M&As do not induce big baths. JEL Classification: C23, G21, G28, M41, M48

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来源期刊

Journal of Emerging Market Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

1.80

自引率

33.30%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Emerging Market Finance is a forum for debate and discussion on the theory and practice of finance in emerging markets. While the emphasis is on articles that are of practical significance, the journal also covers theoretical and conceptual aspects relating to emerging financial markets. Peer-reviewed, the journal is equally useful to practitioners and to banking and investment companies as to scholars.