关于二元防策略社会选择函数的注解

IF 0.6 Q4 ECONOMICS

Games Pub Date : 2022-11-18 DOI:10.3390/g13060078

A. Basile, A. Simone, C. Tarantino

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引用次数: 0

摘要

设Φn为二元策略证明的社会选择函数的集合，指的是一组n个选民，他们被允许在两个选项之间宣布冷漠。我们提供了一种从集合Φn获得集合Φn+1的递归方法。计算基数|Φn|在计算Dedekind数时存在困难。后者给出了当只允许严格偏好时类似数量的社会选择函数。给出了已知值的比较。基于我们的结果，我们给出了三个选民情况下二元策略证明的社会选择函数的图形描述。

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A Note on Binary Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions

Let Φn be the set of the binary strategy-proof social choice functions referred to a group of n voters who are allowed to declare indifference between the alternatives. We provide a recursive way to obtain the set Φn+1 from the set Φn. Computing the cardinalities |Φn| presents difficulties as the computation of the Dedekind numbers. The latter give the analogous number of social choice functions when only strict preferences are admitted. A comparison is given for the known values. Based on our results, we present a graphical description of the binary strategy-proof social choice functions in the case of three voters.

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来源期刊

Games Decision Sciences-Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

11.10%

发文量

审稿时长

11 weeks

期刊介绍： Games (ISSN 2073-4336) is an international, peer-reviewed, quick-refereeing open access journal (free for readers), which provides an advanced forum for studies related to strategic interaction, game theory and its applications, and decision making. The aim is to provide an interdisciplinary forum for all behavioral sciences and related fields, including economics, psychology, political science, mathematics, computer science, and biology (including animal behavior). To guarantee a rapid refereeing and editorial process, Games follows standard publication practices in the natural sciences.