{"title":"政治自由公平价值的论证是什么?","authors":"W. Edmundson","doi":"10.5840/soctheorpract202043094","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The equal political liberties are among the basic first-principle liberties in John Rawls’s theory of Justice as fairness. But Rawls insists, further, that the “fair value” of the political liberties must be guaranteed, and that a market economy must be embedded in an institutional structure that realizes this guarantee. The aim and the supposed capacity to assure fair value are what distinguish property-owning democracy and liberal democratic socialism from other ideal regime-types. Disavowing an interest in fair value is what disqualifies welfare-state capitalism as a possible realization of Justice as fairness. \nYet Rawls never gives a perspicuous statement of the reasoning in the original position for the fair-value guarantee. This article gathers up the two distinct strands of Rawls’s argument, and presents it in a straightforward sequence. The exposition proceeds by contrasting Justice as fairness to a competitor political conception of justice, called here Neoliberalism, which is just like Justice as fairness but without the fair-value guarantee. A schema of the two-strand argument is presented in the Appendix.","PeriodicalId":82726,"journal":{"name":"Social theory and practice","volume":"46 1","pages":"497-514"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"What Is the Argument for the Fair Value of Political Liberty?\",\"authors\":\"W. Edmundson\",\"doi\":\"10.5840/soctheorpract202043094\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The equal political liberties are among the basic first-principle liberties in John Rawls’s theory of Justice as fairness. But Rawls insists, further, that the “fair value” of the political liberties must be guaranteed, and that a market economy must be embedded in an institutional structure that realizes this guarantee. The aim and the supposed capacity to assure fair value are what distinguish property-owning democracy and liberal democratic socialism from other ideal regime-types. Disavowing an interest in fair value is what disqualifies welfare-state capitalism as a possible realization of Justice as fairness. \\nYet Rawls never gives a perspicuous statement of the reasoning in the original position for the fair-value guarantee. This article gathers up the two distinct strands of Rawls’s argument, and presents it in a straightforward sequence. The exposition proceeds by contrasting Justice as fairness to a competitor political conception of justice, called here Neoliberalism, which is just like Justice as fairness but without the fair-value guarantee. A schema of the two-strand argument is presented in the Appendix.\",\"PeriodicalId\":82726,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Social theory and practice\",\"volume\":\"46 1\",\"pages\":\"497-514\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-05-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Social theory and practice\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract202043094\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Social theory and practice","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract202043094","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
What Is the Argument for the Fair Value of Political Liberty?
The equal political liberties are among the basic first-principle liberties in John Rawls’s theory of Justice as fairness. But Rawls insists, further, that the “fair value” of the political liberties must be guaranteed, and that a market economy must be embedded in an institutional structure that realizes this guarantee. The aim and the supposed capacity to assure fair value are what distinguish property-owning democracy and liberal democratic socialism from other ideal regime-types. Disavowing an interest in fair value is what disqualifies welfare-state capitalism as a possible realization of Justice as fairness.
Yet Rawls never gives a perspicuous statement of the reasoning in the original position for the fair-value guarantee. This article gathers up the two distinct strands of Rawls’s argument, and presents it in a straightforward sequence. The exposition proceeds by contrasting Justice as fairness to a competitor political conception of justice, called here Neoliberalism, which is just like Justice as fairness but without the fair-value guarantee. A schema of the two-strand argument is presented in the Appendix.