{"title":"通往波罗戈斯的道路:","authors":"S. Leitman","doi":"10.14295/RBHCS.V13I25.12035","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The Porongos defeat over the secessionist rebels on November 14, 1844, militarily and politically solidified the barão de Caxias’ coming victory, which would end the longest rebellion in Brazilian history, the farroupilha, 1835-1845. Most of the encounters to come were small, mopping-up and surveillance actions, except for one, at Arroio Grande, just two weeks after Porongos. Suspiciously, the targets of both these assaults were the libertos, slaves the rebels had seized from their provincial loyalist neighbors, and whom they armed and ostensibly freed. Before Porongos, Caxias and the farrapo general Canabarro had arrived at the same conclusion: in order to have peace, conciliation, and a return to Imperial order, the rebels needed proof that their cause was lost. The best and most convenient solution led Caxias and Canabarro to use Black losses to show the war was no longer winnable, and to defang them as a future menace. When Canabarro assembled what was the last great rebel army on the Cerro do Porongos, liberto soldiers comprised its very core. On that November morning, approximately 35% of Canabarro’s troops were either killed, wounded, or captured. Nearly all those who died or were taken prisoner came from the ranks of the liberto infantry. If the many mysteries swirling around Porongos were stripped away, what would emerge and converge at Porongos were two historical shadows still coursing through the borderlands, hatianismo and artiguismo. These were neither doctrines nor unique to the borderlands, yet together they advised both rebel and Imperial policy, and were implicit in the immediacies of decision-making which determined the libertos’ fate. Independent Scholar, Rockville Centre, NY. PhD, University of Texas, 1972. Email: slleitman@optonline.net Revista Brasileira de História & Ciências Sociais – RBHCS Vol. 13 No 25, Edição Especial de 2021 559","PeriodicalId":41269,"journal":{"name":"Revista Brasileira de Historia & Ciencias Sociais","volume":"13 1","pages":"558-591"},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2021-04-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The road to Porongos:\",\"authors\":\"S. Leitman\",\"doi\":\"10.14295/RBHCS.V13I25.12035\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The Porongos defeat over the secessionist rebels on November 14, 1844, militarily and politically solidified the barão de Caxias’ coming victory, which would end the longest rebellion in Brazilian history, the farroupilha, 1835-1845. Most of the encounters to come were small, mopping-up and surveillance actions, except for one, at Arroio Grande, just two weeks after Porongos. Suspiciously, the targets of both these assaults were the libertos, slaves the rebels had seized from their provincial loyalist neighbors, and whom they armed and ostensibly freed. Before Porongos, Caxias and the farrapo general Canabarro had arrived at the same conclusion: in order to have peace, conciliation, and a return to Imperial order, the rebels needed proof that their cause was lost. The best and most convenient solution led Caxias and Canabarro to use Black losses to show the war was no longer winnable, and to defang them as a future menace. When Canabarro assembled what was the last great rebel army on the Cerro do Porongos, liberto soldiers comprised its very core. On that November morning, approximately 35% of Canabarro’s troops were either killed, wounded, or captured. Nearly all those who died or were taken prisoner came from the ranks of the liberto infantry. If the many mysteries swirling around Porongos were stripped away, what would emerge and converge at Porongos were two historical shadows still coursing through the borderlands, hatianismo and artiguismo. These were neither doctrines nor unique to the borderlands, yet together they advised both rebel and Imperial policy, and were implicit in the immediacies of decision-making which determined the libertos’ fate. Independent Scholar, Rockville Centre, NY. PhD, University of Texas, 1972. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
1844年11月14日,波隆戈斯击败分离主义叛军,在军事和政治上巩固了巴郎德卡夏斯即将到来的胜利,这将结束巴西历史上最长的叛乱,即1835-1845年的farroupilha。接下来的大多数遭遇都是小规模的扫荡和监视行动,只有一次是在波隆戈斯事件发生两周后的阿罗约格兰德。令人怀疑的是,这两次袭击的目标都是自由人,他们是叛军从忠于他们的省级邻居那里夺取的奴隶,他们武装了这些奴隶,并表面上释放了他们。在波罗戈斯之前,卡夏斯和法拉波将军卡纳巴罗得出了相同的结论:为了实现和平、和解和恢复帝国秩序,叛军需要证明他们的事业已经失败。最好、最方便的解决方案导致卡西亚斯和卡纳巴罗利用布莱克的损失来表明战争已经无法获胜,并将他们视为未来的威胁。当Canabarro在Cerro do Porongos集结了最后一支伟大的叛军时,自由战士构成了其核心。在11月的那个早晨,大约35%的卡纳巴罗部队要么被杀,要么受伤,要么被俘。几乎所有死亡或被俘的人都来自自由人步兵队伍。如果波隆戈斯周围的许多谜团被剥去,那么在波隆戈斯出现并汇聚的将是两个仍在边境地区流动的历史阴影,仇恨主义和艺术主义。这些既不是学说,也不是边境地区独有的,但它们共同为反叛者和帝国政策提供了建议,并隐含在决定自由者命运的决策的直接性中。 独立学者,纽约洛克维尔中心。博士,得克萨斯大学,1972年。电子邮件:slleitman@optonline.net《巴西历史与社会评论》(Revista Brasileira de História&Ciências Sociais)-RBHCS第13卷第25期,2021年教育特别版559
The Porongos defeat over the secessionist rebels on November 14, 1844, militarily and politically solidified the barão de Caxias’ coming victory, which would end the longest rebellion in Brazilian history, the farroupilha, 1835-1845. Most of the encounters to come were small, mopping-up and surveillance actions, except for one, at Arroio Grande, just two weeks after Porongos. Suspiciously, the targets of both these assaults were the libertos, slaves the rebels had seized from their provincial loyalist neighbors, and whom they armed and ostensibly freed. Before Porongos, Caxias and the farrapo general Canabarro had arrived at the same conclusion: in order to have peace, conciliation, and a return to Imperial order, the rebels needed proof that their cause was lost. The best and most convenient solution led Caxias and Canabarro to use Black losses to show the war was no longer winnable, and to defang them as a future menace. When Canabarro assembled what was the last great rebel army on the Cerro do Porongos, liberto soldiers comprised its very core. On that November morning, approximately 35% of Canabarro’s troops were either killed, wounded, or captured. Nearly all those who died or were taken prisoner came from the ranks of the liberto infantry. If the many mysteries swirling around Porongos were stripped away, what would emerge and converge at Porongos were two historical shadows still coursing through the borderlands, hatianismo and artiguismo. These were neither doctrines nor unique to the borderlands, yet together they advised both rebel and Imperial policy, and were implicit in the immediacies of decision-making which determined the libertos’ fate. Independent Scholar, Rockville Centre, NY. PhD, University of Texas, 1972. Email: slleitman@optonline.net Revista Brasileira de História & Ciências Sociais – RBHCS Vol. 13 No 25, Edição Especial de 2021 559