博弈论与第一次世界大战

IF 11.5 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Literature Pub Date : 2023-06-01 DOI:10.1257/jel.20211571

R. Myerson

{"title":"博弈论与第一次世界大战","authors":"R. Myerson","doi":"10.1257/jel.20211571","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Books by Scott Wolford and Roger Ransom show how economic theories of games and decisions can be fruitfully applied to problems in World War I. This vital application offers fundamental insights into the analytical methods of game theory. Public random variables may be essential factors in war-of-attrition games. An assumption that nations can coordinate on Pareto-superior equilibria may become less tenable when nations are at war. Interpreting a surprising mistake as evidence of an unlikely type can have serious consequences. The ability of leaders to foster consistent beliefs within a cohesive society can create inconsistency of beliefs between nations at war. (JEL C70, D74, D83, F51, N40)","PeriodicalId":48416,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Economic Literature","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":11.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Game Theory and the First World War\",\"authors\":\"R. Myerson\",\"doi\":\"10.1257/jel.20211571\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Books by Scott Wolford and Roger Ransom show how economic theories of games and decisions can be fruitfully applied to problems in World War I. This vital application offers fundamental insights into the analytical methods of game theory. Public random variables may be essential factors in war-of-attrition games. An assumption that nations can coordinate on Pareto-superior equilibria may become less tenable when nations are at war. Interpreting a surprising mistake as evidence of an unlikely type can have serious consequences. The ability of leaders to foster consistent beliefs within a cohesive society can create inconsistency of beliefs between nations at war. (JEL C70, D74, D83, F51, N40)\",\"PeriodicalId\":48416,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Economic Literature\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":11.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Economic Literature\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20211571\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Economic Literature","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20211571","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

摘要

斯科特·沃尔福德(Scott Wolford)和罗杰·兰森(Roger Ransom)的书展示了如何将博弈和决策的经济理论有效地应用于第一次世界大战中的问题。这种重要的应用为博弈论的分析方法提供了基本的见解。公共随机变量可能是消耗战游戏中的重要因素。当国家处于战争状态时，国家可以在帕累托优均衡上进行协调的假设可能会变得不那么站得脚。将一个令人惊讶的错误解释为不太可能的证据可能会产生严重的后果。领导人在一个有凝聚力的社会中培养一致信念的能力，可能会在处于战争状态的国家之间造成信念的不一致。(凝胶c70, d74, d83, f51, n40)

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Game Theory and the First World War

Books by Scott Wolford and Roger Ransom show how economic theories of games and decisions can be fruitfully applied to problems in World War I. This vital application offers fundamental insights into the analytical methods of game theory. Public random variables may be essential factors in war-of-attrition games. An assumption that nations can coordinate on Pareto-superior equilibria may become less tenable when nations are at war. Interpreting a surprising mistake as evidence of an unlikely type can have serious consequences. The ability of leaders to foster consistent beliefs within a cohesive society can create inconsistency of beliefs between nations at war. (JEL C70, D74, D83, F51, N40)

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Journal of Economic Literature ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

17.80

自引率

0.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： Commencing in 1969, the Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) serves as a vital resource for economists, offering a means to stay informed about the extensive literature in the field. Each JEL issue features commissioned, peer-reviewed survey and review articles, book reviews, an annotated bibliography categorizing new books by subject, and an annual index of dissertations from North American universities.