{"title":"如何解决恶的问题","authors":"J. Mooney","doi":"10.5840/faithphil20191121132","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"One paradigmatic argument from evil against theism claims that (1) if God exists, then there is no gratuitous evil. But (2) there is gratuitous evil, so (3) God does not exist. I consider three deontological strategies for resisting this argument. Each strategy restructures existing theodicies which deny (2) so that they instead deny (1). The first two strategies are problematic on their own, but their primary weaknesses vanish when they are combined to form the third strategy, resulting in a promising new approach to the problem of evil.","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/faithphil20191121132","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"How to Solve the Problem of Evil\",\"authors\":\"J. Mooney\",\"doi\":\"10.5840/faithphil20191121132\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"One paradigmatic argument from evil against theism claims that (1) if God exists, then there is no gratuitous evil. But (2) there is gratuitous evil, so (3) God does not exist. I consider three deontological strategies for resisting this argument. Each strategy restructures existing theodicies which deny (2) so that they instead deny (1). The first two strategies are problematic on their own, but their primary weaknesses vanish when they are combined to form the third strategy, resulting in a promising new approach to the problem of evil.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45294,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Faith and Philosophy\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/faithphil20191121132\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Faith and Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil20191121132\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Faith and Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil20191121132","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
One paradigmatic argument from evil against theism claims that (1) if God exists, then there is no gratuitous evil. But (2) there is gratuitous evil, so (3) God does not exist. I consider three deontological strategies for resisting this argument. Each strategy restructures existing theodicies which deny (2) so that they instead deny (1). The first two strategies are problematic on their own, but their primary weaknesses vanish when they are combined to form the third strategy, resulting in a promising new approach to the problem of evil.
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