The World’s Most Prestigious Prize: The Inside Story of the Nobel Peace Prize

Second, the author points out that well aware of the risks of nuclear escalation and using nuclear weapons, Kennedy and Khrushchev were determined to keep American and Soviet military forces under tight control and managed to do so. Third, The Silent Guns emphasises that the extremely cautious behaviours of numerous civilian and military lower rank officials on both sides contributed to avoiding a nuclear war. Based on this analysis, the author observes, ‘the Cold War environment of October 1962 proved to be a surprisingly safe period’ [268]. However, this reviewer wonders if Kennedy was ready to allow the Soviets to take over Berlin. His political stakes in the city were much higher than in Turkey. Nevertheless, Kennedy wanted to avoid a straightforward trade between Cuba and Turkey. Indeed, for him, even the concession over Turkey had to be secret or made under a diplomatic cover like the Cordier ploy to minimise damage to domestic and alliance politics. Vorhees might have reached different conclusions if he had examined Kennedy’s concern over Berlin in the wider historical context of the Berlin crisis. In addition, there seems to be some room for debate regarding the stability of the Cold War system in October 1962. Certainly, the self-restraint of the actors involved in the missile crisis, especially those at lower levels, contributed to the absence of a nuclear catastrophe. However, this does not completely rule out the possibility of what Dean Acheson called ‘plain dumb luck’ averting nuclear war. Nevertheless, The Silent Guns offers some new findings and stimulating arguments on the nexus between domestic politics and diplomacy, the inner workings of the backchannel diplomacy between Kennedy and Khrushchev, Kennedy’s fallback to avoid nuclear war, and the problem of how close the Cuban crisis came to nuclear apocalypse. With these insights, the book contributes to further understanding of the Cuban Missile Crisis.