{"title":"娱乐业的包装交易:一种讨价还价的方法","authors":"Thomas J. Miceli","doi":"10.1080/08997764.2021.1922836","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Creation of a television or movie project requires the bundling of inputs – writers, actors, directors – into a coherent package that can be produced and distributed. Traditionally this bundling was done by studios, which then negotiated compensation deals with input suppliers via their agents. However, large talent agencies have increasingly engaged in the practice of “packaging,” which involves creating vehicles for their clients and selling the bundled projects to studios. The union for screenwriters has challenged this activity as constituting an unfair business practice, arguing that it creates a conflict of interest on the part of agencies. This paper evaluates this claim in a bargaining framework with transaction-specific investments and a possible holdup problem.","PeriodicalId":29945,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF MEDIA ECONOMICS","volume":"33 1","pages":"1 - 12"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2020-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08997764.2021.1922836","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Packaging deals in the entertainment industry: a bargaining approach\",\"authors\":\"Thomas J. Miceli\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/08997764.2021.1922836\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT Creation of a television or movie project requires the bundling of inputs – writers, actors, directors – into a coherent package that can be produced and distributed. Traditionally this bundling was done by studios, which then negotiated compensation deals with input suppliers via their agents. However, large talent agencies have increasingly engaged in the practice of “packaging,” which involves creating vehicles for their clients and selling the bundled projects to studios. The union for screenwriters has challenged this activity as constituting an unfair business practice, arguing that it creates a conflict of interest on the part of agencies. This paper evaluates this claim in a bargaining framework with transaction-specific investments and a possible holdup problem.\",\"PeriodicalId\":29945,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"JOURNAL OF MEDIA ECONOMICS\",\"volume\":\"33 1\",\"pages\":\"1 - 12\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-04-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/08997764.2021.1922836\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"JOURNAL OF MEDIA ECONOMICS\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997764.2021.1922836\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"COMMUNICATION\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"JOURNAL OF MEDIA ECONOMICS","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08997764.2021.1922836","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"COMMUNICATION","Score":null,"Total":0}
Packaging deals in the entertainment industry: a bargaining approach
ABSTRACT Creation of a television or movie project requires the bundling of inputs – writers, actors, directors – into a coherent package that can be produced and distributed. Traditionally this bundling was done by studios, which then negotiated compensation deals with input suppliers via their agents. However, large talent agencies have increasingly engaged in the practice of “packaging,” which involves creating vehicles for their clients and selling the bundled projects to studios. The union for screenwriters has challenged this activity as constituting an unfair business practice, arguing that it creates a conflict of interest on the part of agencies. This paper evaluates this claim in a bargaining framework with transaction-specific investments and a possible holdup problem.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Media Economics publishes original research on the economics and policy of mediated communication, focusing on firms, markets, and institutions. Reflecting the increasing diversity of analytical approaches employed in economics and recognizing that policies promoting social and political objectives may have significant economic impacts on media, the Journal encourages submissions reflecting the insights of diverse disciplinary perspectives and research methodologies, both empirical and theoretical.