一个好的原告是不够的

IF 1.8 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
A. Bruhl
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引用次数: 2

摘要

本文关注的是近年来在许多最引人注目的争议中出现的第三条地位的一个方面,包括有关《平价医疗法案》、移民政策和气候变化的诉讼。尽管联邦法院不断强调确保只有合适的原告才能援引联邦司法权的重要性,但最高法院和其他联邦法院对通常的诉讼资格要求提出了一个重要的例外。这一例外认为,受理多原告案件的法院只要认定一名原告具有诉讼资格,就可以不调查每一原告的诉讼资格。这种部分绕过诉讼资格要求的做法并不局限于原告无论如何都将在其他理由上败诉的案件。换句话说,法院愿意假设所有原告都有诉讼资格,只要一个原告有诉讼资格,然后决定对所有原告有利或不利的是非曲直,尽管对其中一些原告的诉讼资格存在疑问。我们可以称之为“一原告规则”。本文从规范和积极的角度对原告一人规则进行了考察。在规范方面,目标是确立一原告规则在原则、先例和政策方面是错误的。所有原告都需要诉讼资格,即使他们都提出了类似的法律主张,也不管他们寻求何种形式的救济。为了激发规范性探究,文章还解释了为什么一原告规则作为一个实际问题是有害的,即因为它将具体的利益和损害分配给了不属于他们的人。该条的另一个主要目的是解释为何错误的一原告规则会获得如此广泛的接受。解释性解释将一原告规则的责任归咎于法院和诉讼当事人的动机,以及对司法权性质的某些有问题的理解的发展。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
One Good Plaintiff Is Not Enough
This Article concerns an aspect of Article III standing that has figured in many of the highest-profile controversies of recent years, including litigation over the Affordable Care Act, immigration policy, and climate change. Although the federal courts constantly emphasize the importance of ensuring that only proper plaintiffs invoke the federal judicial power, the Supreme Court and other federal courts have developed a significant exception to the usual requirement of standing. This exception holds that a court entertaining a multiple-plaintiff case may dispense with inquiring into the standing of each plaintiff as long as the court finds that one plaintiff has standing. This practice of partially bypassing the requirement of standing is not limited to cases in which the plaintiffs are about to lose on other grounds anyway. Put differently, courts are willing to assume that all plaintiffs have standing as long as one plaintiff has it and then decide the merits either for or against all plaintiffs despite doubts as to the standing of some of those plaintiffs. We could call this the “one-plaintiff rule.”This Article examines the one-plaintiff rule from normative and positive perspectives. On the normative side, the goal is to establish that the one-plaintiff rule is erroneous in light of principle, precedent, and policy. All plaintiffs need standing, even if all of them present similar legal claims and regardless of the form of relief they seek. To motivate the normative inquiry, the Article also explains why the one-plaintiff rule is harmful as a practical matter, namely because it assigns concrete benefits and detriments to persons to whom they do not belong. The Article’s other principal goal is to explain the puzzle of how the mistaken one-plaintiff rule could attain such widespread acceptance. The explanatory account assigns the blame for the one-plaintiff rule to the incentives of courts and litigants as well as to the development of certain problematic understandings of the nature of judicial power.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The first issue of what was to become the Duke Law Journal was published in March 1951 as the Duke Bar Journal. Created to provide a medium for student expression, the Duke Bar Journal consisted entirely of student-written and student-edited work until 1953, when it began publishing faculty contributions. To reflect the inclusion of faculty scholarship, the Duke Bar Journal became the Duke Law Journal in 1957. In 1969, the Journal published its inaugural Administrative Law Symposium issue, a tradition that continues today. Volume 1 of the Duke Bar Journal spanned two issues and 259 pages. In 1959, the Journal grew to four issues and 649 pages, growing again in 1970 to six issues and 1263 pages. Today, the Duke Law Journal publishes eight issues per volume. Our staff is committed to the purpose set forth in our constitution: to publish legal writing of superior quality. We seek to publish a collection of outstanding scholarship from established legal writers, up-and-coming authors, and our own student editors.
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