概念可能仍然是对象

IF 0.3 3区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

Organon F Pub Date : 2022-09-24 DOI:10.31577/orgf.2022.29304

H. Noonan

{"title":"概念可能仍然是对象","authors":"H. Noonan","doi":"10.31577/orgf.2022.29304","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":": In his book (2021) Trueman attempts to provide a solution to the problem of the concept horse, which according to Frege’s published writings is an object, not a concept. In the course of doing so Trueman rejects Wright’s response (1998) according to which some objects are also concepts, for example, the concept horse, so the categories are not exclusive. Trueman’s argument for exclusivity (Chap-ter 4) is the heart of the book, and as he says , it is his response to holders of differing views, like Wright. I think that there is a gap in Trueman’s argument which needs to be filled if Wright is to be considered refuted.","PeriodicalId":43025,"journal":{"name":"Organon F","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2022-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Concepts May Still Be Objects\",\"authors\":\"H. Noonan\",\"doi\":\"10.31577/orgf.2022.29304\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\": In his book (2021) Trueman attempts to provide a solution to the problem of the concept horse, which according to Frege’s published writings is an object, not a concept. In the course of doing so Trueman rejects Wright’s response (1998) according to which some objects are also concepts, for example, the concept horse, so the categories are not exclusive. Trueman’s argument for exclusivity (Chap-ter 4) is the heart of the book, and as he says , it is his response to holders of differing views, like Wright. I think that there is a gap in Trueman’s argument which needs to be filled if Wright is to be considered refuted.\",\"PeriodicalId\":43025,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Organon F\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-09-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Organon F\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29304\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Organon F","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29304","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

：在他的书（2021）中，特鲁曼试图为概念马的问题提供一个解决方案，根据弗雷格出版的著作，概念马是一个物体，而不是一个概念。在这样做的过程中，Trueman拒绝了Wright的回应（1998），根据该回应，一些物体也是概念，例如概念马，因此类别不是排他性的。特鲁曼关于排他性的论点（第四章）是这本书的核心，正如他所说，这是他对赖特等持不同观点者的回应。我认为特鲁曼的论点中有一个空白，如果要认为赖特被驳斥，就需要填补这个空白。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Concepts May Still Be Objects

: In his book (2021) Trueman attempts to provide a solution to the problem of the concept horse, which according to Frege’s published writings is an object, not a concept. In the course of doing so Trueman rejects Wright’s response (1998) according to which some objects are also concepts, for example, the concept horse, so the categories are not exclusive. Trueman’s argument for exclusivity (Chap-ter 4) is the heart of the book, and as he says , it is his response to holders of differing views, like Wright. I think that there is a gap in Trueman’s argument which needs to be filled if Wright is to be considered refuted.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Organon F PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

0.70

自引率

20.00%

发文量

审稿时长

38 weeks

期刊介绍： Organon F publishes high-quality articles on the entire range of topics discussed in contemporary analytic philosophy. Accordingly, we invite authors to submit articles that address issues that belong, but are not limited, to philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, epistemology, metaphysics and philosophical logic. We also consider analytically written articles on ethics, aesthetics, social philosophy, political philosophy and history of philosophy. The principal aim is to publish original articles that meet the standards typical of analytic philosophy, primarily those of conceptual clarity, precision and soundness of argumentation.