Asset Securitization and Welfare Compensation for House Demolition on New-Type Urbanization in China

In this paper we design a compensation mechanism for the relocated households in the process of New-Type Urbanization in China. Based on the theories of dynamic rent spatial separation, bid-rent and non-renewable resource exploitation, we give a theretical look at how the current compensation mechanism shapes the welfare of relocated households. Firstly, land rent growth has a spatial difference and the growth rate of the marginal location rent is much higher than that of the mature site. Secondly, there is a demolition championship contest under the sole static money compensation, which can easily lead to land urbanization faster than population urbanization. Thirdly, in the long run the welfare loss of the household is mainly due to the absence of a dynamic compensation mechanism. Furthermore, we design a dynamic compensation mechanism based on the establishment of an asset securitization capital pool, which could be an alternative scheme in the process of New-Type Urbanization.