{"title":"为什么经纪人追求公共产品和服务?布宜诺斯艾利斯郊区两个案例的民族志分析(阿根廷)","authors":"P. Besana","doi":"10.26851/rucp.28.5","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"espanolSegun expertos, los brokers se involucran exclusivamente en intercambios discrecionales de favores por apoyo politico entre patrones politicos y clientes. Para que el intercambio se concrete es necesario que los favores no sean de goce publico, sino que beneficien solo a quienes esten dispuestos a prestar su apoyo politico a cambio. No obstante, este estudio etnografico muestra como dos brokers persiguen bienes y servicios publicos e, incluso, lideran protestas sociales en demanda por ellos. Se sugiere que estos no son casos excepcionales, sino que los brokers tienen incentivos para hacerlo porque en su mayoria son vecinos de sus clientes y sufren tanto como ellos la falta de acceso a bienes y servicios publicos EnglishAccording to experts, broker exclusively involves in discretionary exchange of favors for political support between political patrons and clients. For the exchange to take place, favors should not be of public benefit, but only for those who are willing to lend their political support in return. However, this ethnographic stud shows how two brokers usually seek public goods and services and even lead social protests in demand for them. It is suggested that these are not exceptional cases, since brokers have incentives to do so because they are mostly neighbors of their clients and suffer as much as they, lack of access to public goods and services","PeriodicalId":30990,"journal":{"name":"Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Politica","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"¿POR QUÉ LOS BROKERS PERSIGUEN BIENES Y SERVICIOS PÚBLICOS? ANÁLISIS ETNOGRÁFICO DE DOS CASOS DE LA PERIFERIA DE BUENOS AIRES (ARGENTINA)\",\"authors\":\"P. Besana\",\"doi\":\"10.26851/rucp.28.5\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"espanolSegun expertos, los brokers se involucran exclusivamente en intercambios discrecionales de favores por apoyo politico entre patrones politicos y clientes. Para que el intercambio se concrete es necesario que los favores no sean de goce publico, sino que beneficien solo a quienes esten dispuestos a prestar su apoyo politico a cambio. No obstante, este estudio etnografico muestra como dos brokers persiguen bienes y servicios publicos e, incluso, lideran protestas sociales en demanda por ellos. Se sugiere que estos no son casos excepcionales, sino que los brokers tienen incentivos para hacerlo porque en su mayoria son vecinos de sus clientes y sufren tanto como ellos la falta de acceso a bienes y servicios publicos EnglishAccording to experts, broker exclusively involves in discretionary exchange of favors for political support between political patrons and clients. For the exchange to take place, favors should not be of public benefit, but only for those who are willing to lend their political support in return. However, this ethnographic stud shows how two brokers usually seek public goods and services and even lead social protests in demand for them. It is suggested that these are not exceptional cases, since brokers have incentives to do so because they are mostly neighbors of their clients and suffer as much as they, lack of access to public goods and services\",\"PeriodicalId\":30990,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Politica\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-11-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Politica\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.26851/rucp.28.5\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Politica","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.26851/rucp.28.5","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
摘要
根据专家的说法,经纪人只参与政治赞助人和客户之间的政治支持交易。要使这种交换成为现实,就必须使恩惠不为公众所享受,而只使那些愿意提供政治支持作为回报的人受益。然而,这项民族志研究显示了两个经纪人如何追求公共商品和服务,甚至领导社会抗议要求他们。建议这些不是特例,而是brokers近邻的奖励,因为在这么多的大部分客户面临的,只要他们缺乏获得货物和服务publicos EnglishAccording to专家,broker exclusively涉及in discretionary exchange of clients favors for political patrons)与政治支持。为了进行交换,优惠不应是公共利益,而应只给予那些愿意提供政治支持作为回报的人。但是,这种通常ethnographic螺栓节目how two brokers失所public goods and services and even畜牧社会抗议的需求。有人建议,这些都不是例外情况,因为经纪人有这样做的动机,因为他们大多是客户的邻居,而且他们也遭受了很大的损失,无法获得公共商品和服务。
¿POR QUÉ LOS BROKERS PERSIGUEN BIENES Y SERVICIOS PÚBLICOS? ANÁLISIS ETNOGRÁFICO DE DOS CASOS DE LA PERIFERIA DE BUENOS AIRES (ARGENTINA)
espanolSegun expertos, los brokers se involucran exclusivamente en intercambios discrecionales de favores por apoyo politico entre patrones politicos y clientes. Para que el intercambio se concrete es necesario que los favores no sean de goce publico, sino que beneficien solo a quienes esten dispuestos a prestar su apoyo politico a cambio. No obstante, este estudio etnografico muestra como dos brokers persiguen bienes y servicios publicos e, incluso, lideran protestas sociales en demanda por ellos. Se sugiere que estos no son casos excepcionales, sino que los brokers tienen incentivos para hacerlo porque en su mayoria son vecinos de sus clientes y sufren tanto como ellos la falta de acceso a bienes y servicios publicos EnglishAccording to experts, broker exclusively involves in discretionary exchange of favors for political support between political patrons and clients. For the exchange to take place, favors should not be of public benefit, but only for those who are willing to lend their political support in return. However, this ethnographic stud shows how two brokers usually seek public goods and services and even lead social protests in demand for them. It is suggested that these are not exceptional cases, since brokers have incentives to do so because they are mostly neighbors of their clients and suffer as much as they, lack of access to public goods and services