没有盖世太保:j·埃德加·胡佛的全球情报服务和国家安全国家官僚自治的限制

IF 0.5 3区 社会学 Q4 POLITICAL SCIENCE
H. Blain
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引用次数: 0

摘要

国家安全官员到底有多强大?在美国,他们似乎不仅仅是行政人员,同时还从属于民选政治家。然而,尽管在美国政治发展中有丰富的关于各种政策领域官僚自治的文献,但国家安全仍然缺乏理论化。虽然国家安全官僚机构的起源和演变已经受到了大量的学术关注,但这个官僚机构中的个人却没有。在本文中,我考察了一个案例研究,说明这些人中的一个是如何坦率地挑战他的权力极限的。第二次世界大战后,j·埃德加·胡佛(J. Edgar Hoover)建立“全球情报机构”(worldwide Intelligence Service)的计划很快被杜鲁门政府否决,后者转而对国内情报机构和全球情报机构进行了严格区分。我把这次惨败归咎于三个相互关联的因素:杜鲁门总统的抵制,二战后出现的一系列官僚竞争对手,以及关键决策者对“美国盖世太保”前景的极度厌恶。在追溯这一历史叙述的同时,我也对胡佛作为一个近乎无所不能的华盛顿操纵者的说法提出了质疑,质疑战争在多大程度上赋予了国家安全官员权力,并强调了类比在塑造国家安全状态中的作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
No Gestapo: J. Edgar Hoover's world-wide intelligence service and the limits of bureaucratic autonomy in the national security state
Abstract How powerful are national security bureaucrats? In the United States, they seem to be more than mere administrators, while remaining subordinate to elected politicians. However, despite a rich literature in American political development on bureaucratic autonomy across a variety of policy areas, national security remains undertheorized. Although the origins and evolution of the national security bureaucracy have received substantial scholarly attention, the individuals within this bureaucracy have not. In this article, I examine a case study of how one of these individuals bluntly ran up against the limits of his power. After the Second World War, J. Edgar Hoover's plans for a “World-Wide Intelligence Service” were swiftly shot down by the Truman administration, which adopted a sharp distinction between domestic and global intelligence instead. I pin this abject defeat on three interrelated factors: the resistance of President Truman, the array of bureaucratic competitors emerging from the Second World War, and deep aversion among key decision makers to the prospect of an “American gestapo.” While tracing this historical narrative, I also challenge accounts of Hoover as a near-omnipotent Washington operator, question the extent to which war empowers national security bureaucrats, and foreground the role of analogies in shaping the national security state.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
12.50%
发文量
21
期刊介绍: Studies in American Political Development (SAPD) publishes scholarship on political change and institutional development in the United States from a variety of theoretical viewpoints. Articles focus on governmental institutions over time and on their social, economic and cultural setting. In-depth presentation in a longer format allows contributors to elaborate on the complex patterns of state-society relations. SAPD encourages an interdisciplinary approach and recognizes the value of comparative perspectives.
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