{"title":"听声音,解读文字","authors":"Mark Q. Gardiner","doi":"10.1558/jcsr.19502","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this commentary I will be exploring a number of implications that McCauley and Graham’s theses about the interrelationship of normal, religious, and mentally disordered cognition have for an interpretative methodology that has been fruitfully utilized by empirically-oriented scholars of religion. I argue that that methodology imposes some important constraints on the type of theorizing McCauley and Graham propose, and that their findings in turn suggest some important modifications to that methodology.","PeriodicalId":29718,"journal":{"name":"Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2021-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Hearing Voices, Interpreting Words\",\"authors\":\"Mark Q. Gardiner\",\"doi\":\"10.1558/jcsr.19502\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this commentary I will be exploring a number of implications that McCauley and Graham’s theses about the interrelationship of normal, religious, and mentally disordered cognition have for an interpretative methodology that has been fruitfully utilized by empirically-oriented scholars of religion. I argue that that methodology imposes some important constraints on the type of theorizing McCauley and Graham propose, and that their findings in turn suggest some important modifications to that methodology.\",\"PeriodicalId\":29718,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-08-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1558/jcsr.19502\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"RELIGION\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal for the Cognitive Science of Religion","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1558/jcsr.19502","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"RELIGION","Score":null,"Total":0}
In this commentary I will be exploring a number of implications that McCauley and Graham’s theses about the interrelationship of normal, religious, and mentally disordered cognition have for an interpretative methodology that has been fruitfully utilized by empirically-oriented scholars of religion. I argue that that methodology imposes some important constraints on the type of theorizing McCauley and Graham propose, and that their findings in turn suggest some important modifications to that methodology.