{"title":"分析大型游戏的稳健性和稳定性","authors":"R. Gradwohl, E. Kalai","doi":"10.1146/ANNUREV-ECONOMICS-072720-042303","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This review focuses on properties related to the robustness and stability of Nash equilibria in games with a large number of players. Somewhat surprisingly, these equilibria become substantially more robust and stable as the number of players increases. We illustrate the relevant phenomena through a binary-action game with strategic substitutes, framed as a game of social isolation in a pandemic environment.","PeriodicalId":47891,"journal":{"name":"Annual Review of Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.8000,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Large Games: Robustness and Stability\",\"authors\":\"R. Gradwohl, E. Kalai\",\"doi\":\"10.1146/ANNUREV-ECONOMICS-072720-042303\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This review focuses on properties related to the robustness and stability of Nash equilibria in games with a large number of players. Somewhat surprisingly, these equilibria become substantially more robust and stable as the number of players increases. We illustrate the relevant phenomena through a binary-action game with strategic substitutes, framed as a game of social isolation in a pandemic environment.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47891,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Annual Review of Economics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":6.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-08-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Annual Review of Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1146/ANNUREV-ECONOMICS-072720-042303\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Annual Review of Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1146/ANNUREV-ECONOMICS-072720-042303","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
This review focuses on properties related to the robustness and stability of Nash equilibria in games with a large number of players. Somewhat surprisingly, these equilibria become substantially more robust and stable as the number of players increases. We illustrate the relevant phenomena through a binary-action game with strategic substitutes, framed as a game of social isolation in a pandemic environment.
期刊介绍:
The Annual Review of Economics covers significant developments in the field of economics, including macroeconomics and money; microeconomics, including economic psychology; international economics; public finance; health economics; education; economic growth and technological change; economic development; social economics, including culture, institutions, social interaction, and networks; game theory, political economy, and social choice; and more.