Carpe Data:保护天真用户的在线隐私

IF 4.5 3区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Information Economics and Policy Pub Date : 2022-09-01 DOI:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2022.100988

Laura Abrardi, Carlo Cambini

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引用次数: 1

摘要

在本文中，我们研究了激励的最优设计，以诱导数字平台限制用户的数据提取，用户的隐私损失进一步加剧了他们对平台的幼稚使用。我们表明，收集的数据量的上限可以诱导平台的最佳数据节省努力。如果平台的努力是不可观察的，那么应该提供一个数据上限的菜单，相对于第一种最好的方式，它需要更少(更多)天真的用户更大(更低)的隐私损失。我们还表明，对用户的数据进行补偿可以有效地激励用户的努力，但可能会增加更幼稚用户的隐私损失。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Carpe Data: Protecting online privacy with naive users

In this paper, we study the optimal design of incentives to induce a digital platform to limit the extraction of data from users, whose privacy loss is further aggravated by their naive use of the platform. We show that caps on the amount of data collected can induce the optimal data-saving effort by the platform. If the platform’s effort is not observable, a menu of data caps should be provided and it entails a higher (lower) loss of privacy for less (more) naive users, relative to the first best. We also show that compensating users for their data can efficiently incentivize effort, but might increase the privacy loss of more naive users.

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来源期刊

Information Economics and Policy ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

5.00

自引率

10.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： IEP is an international journal that aims to publish peer-reviewed policy-oriented research about the production, distribution and use of information, including these subjects: the economics of the telecommunications, mass media, and other information industries, the economics of innovation and intellectual property, the role of information in economic development, and the role of information and information technology in the functioning of markets. The purpose of the journal is to provide an interdisciplinary and international forum for theoretical and empirical research that addresses the needs of other researchers, government, and professionals who are involved in the policy-making process. IEP publishes research papers, short contributions, and surveys.