会计可比性对新兴经济体CEO激励计划的影响：董事会独立性的调节作用

IF 2.3 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Asian Review of Accounting Pub Date : 2023-07-18 DOI:10.1108/ara-01-2023-0002

Arash Arianpoor, Somaye Efazati

{"title":"会计可比性对新兴经济体CEO激励计划的影响：董事会独立性的调节作用","authors":"Arash Arianpoor, Somaye Efazati","doi":"10.1108/ara-01-2023-0002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"PurposeThe present study investigates the impact of accounting comparability on chief executive officer (CEO) incentive plans and the moderating role of board independence for companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).Design/methodology/approachThe information about 177 companies in 2014–2021 was examined. In this study, equity-based compensation and cash-based compensation were used as the CEO incentive plans. The equity-based compensation was calculated through the ownership of the CEO shares.FindingsThe results suggest that the higher accounting comparability increases not only CEO equity-based compensation, but also cash-based compensation. Board independence also strengthens the relationship between accounting comparability and CEO compensation. Hypothesis testing based on robustness checks confirmed these results.Originality/valueThe paper is pioneering, to the authors' knowledge, in identifying how board independence moderates the impact of accounting comparability on CEO compensation. The findings provide insights into economic consequences to the firm related to accounting comparability and board monitoring. The results have important practical implications for international investors to evaluate accounting comparability, corporate governance mechanisms and CEO incentives.","PeriodicalId":8562,"journal":{"name":"Asian Review of Accounting","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The impact of accounting comparability on CEO incentive plans in an emerging economy: the moderating role of board independence\",\"authors\":\"Arash Arianpoor, Somaye Efazati\",\"doi\":\"10.1108/ara-01-2023-0002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"PurposeThe present study investigates the impact of accounting comparability on chief executive officer (CEO) incentive plans and the moderating role of board independence for companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).Design/methodology/approachThe information about 177 companies in 2014–2021 was examined. In this study, equity-based compensation and cash-based compensation were used as the CEO incentive plans. The equity-based compensation was calculated through the ownership of the CEO shares.FindingsThe results suggest that the higher accounting comparability increases not only CEO equity-based compensation, but also cash-based compensation. Board independence also strengthens the relationship between accounting comparability and CEO compensation. Hypothesis testing based on robustness checks confirmed these results.Originality/valueThe paper is pioneering, to the authors' knowledge, in identifying how board independence moderates the impact of accounting comparability on CEO compensation. The findings provide insights into economic consequences to the firm related to accounting comparability and board monitoring. The results have important practical implications for international investors to evaluate accounting comparability, corporate governance mechanisms and CEO incentives.\",\"PeriodicalId\":8562,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Asian Review of Accounting\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-07-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Asian Review of Accounting\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1108/ara-01-2023-0002\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Asian Review of Accounting","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1108/ara-01-2023-0002","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

目的本研究调查了会计可比性对德黑兰证券交易所（TSE）上市公司首席执行官（CEO）激励计划的影响以及董事会独立性的调节作用。设计/方法/方法研究了2014-2011年177家公司的信息。在本研究中，基于股权的薪酬和基于现金的薪酬被用作CEO激励计划。基于股权的薪酬是通过CEO股票的所有权来计算的。研究结果表明，会计可比性越高，CEO的股权薪酬越高，现金薪酬也越高。董事会的独立性也加强了会计可比性与CEO薪酬之间的关系。基于稳健性检验的假设检验证实了这些结果。原创性/价值据作者所知，这篇论文在确定董事会独立性如何调节会计可比性对CEO薪酬的影响方面具有开创性。这些发现为公司在会计可比性和董事会监督方面的经济后果提供了见解。研究结果对国际投资者评估会计可比性、公司治理机制和CEO激励机制具有重要的现实意义。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

The impact of accounting comparability on CEO incentive plans in an emerging economy: the moderating role of board independence

PurposeThe present study investigates the impact of accounting comparability on chief executive officer (CEO) incentive plans and the moderating role of board independence for companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).Design/methodology/approachThe information about 177 companies in 2014–2021 was examined. In this study, equity-based compensation and cash-based compensation were used as the CEO incentive plans. The equity-based compensation was calculated through the ownership of the CEO shares.FindingsThe results suggest that the higher accounting comparability increases not only CEO equity-based compensation, but also cash-based compensation. Board independence also strengthens the relationship between accounting comparability and CEO compensation. Hypothesis testing based on robustness checks confirmed these results.Originality/valueThe paper is pioneering, to the authors' knowledge, in identifying how board independence moderates the impact of accounting comparability on CEO compensation. The findings provide insights into economic consequences to the firm related to accounting comparability and board monitoring. The results have important practical implications for international investors to evaluate accounting comparability, corporate governance mechanisms and CEO incentives.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Asian Review of Accounting BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

25.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Covering various fields of accounting, Asian Review of Accounting publishes research papers, commentary notes, review papers and practitioner oriented articles that address significant international issues as well as those that focus on Asia Pacific in particular.Coverage includes but is not limited to: -Financial accounting -Managerial accounting -Auditing -Taxation -Accounting information systems -Social and environmental accounting -Accounting education Perspectives or viewpoints arising from regional, national or international focus, a private or public sector information need, or a market-perspective or social and environmental perspective are greatly welcomed. Manuscripts that present viewpoints should address issues of wide interest among accounting scholars internationally and those in Asia Pacific in particular.