Limitations to subnational authoritarianism: Indonesian local government head elections in comparative perspective

ABSTRACT In recent years, a sizeable literature on subnational authoritarian regimes in democracies has emerged. In some countries local authoritarian enclaves have persisted despite the democratization of politics at the national level. Even more intriguing, new subnational authoritarian regimes have emerged in the context of national level democratization. Finally, scholars have noted that there is considerable variance in subnational authoritarian regime durability between and within countries. This article will examine why subnational authoritarian regimes have not emerged in Indonesia. Arguably, the difficulties of subnational elites to concentrate control over local economies; the high economic autonomy of voters; and the rigid institutional framework of Indonesia’s decentralized unitary state have inhibited the rise of durable subnational authoritarian regimes in the world’s third largest democracy. One of the first studies on subnational authoritarian regimes in a decentralized unitary state, the article engages and informs the broader literature on subnational authoritarian regimes.