{"title":"上帝如何知道自由的反事实","authors":"J. Mooney","doi":"10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.5","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"One problem for Molinism that critics of the view have pressed, and which Molinists have so far done little to address, is that even if there are true counterfactuals of freedom, it is puzzling how God could possibly know them. I defuse this worry by sketching a plausible model of the mechanics of middle knowledge which draws on William Alston’s direct acquaintance account of divine knowledge.","PeriodicalId":45294,"journal":{"name":"Faith and Philosophy","volume":"37 1","pages":"220-229"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"How God Knows Counterfactuals of Freedom\",\"authors\":\"J. Mooney\",\"doi\":\"10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.5\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"One problem for Molinism that critics of the view have pressed, and which Molinists have so far done little to address, is that even if there are true counterfactuals of freedom, it is puzzling how God could possibly know them. I defuse this worry by sketching a plausible model of the mechanics of middle knowledge which draws on William Alston’s direct acquaintance account of divine knowledge.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45294,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Faith and Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"37 1\",\"pages\":\"220-229\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Faith and Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.5\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Faith and Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.37977/faithphil.2020.37.2.5","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
One problem for Molinism that critics of the view have pressed, and which Molinists have so far done little to address, is that even if there are true counterfactuals of freedom, it is puzzling how God could possibly know them. I defuse this worry by sketching a plausible model of the mechanics of middle knowledge which draws on William Alston’s direct acquaintance account of divine knowledge.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
