机制设计与契约中的鲁棒性

IF 6.8 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Annual Review of Economics Pub Date : 2019-08-23 DOI:10.1146/ANNUREV-ECONOMICS-080218-025616

Gabriel D. Carroll

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引用次数: 56

摘要

这篇综述总结了在设计者对环境不完全了解的情况下设计激励机制的理论研究，并从目前的工作中提供了一些一般的经验教训。这些基于不确定性和鲁棒性的最新模型为工具包提供了一套额外的工具，与更传统的全贝叶斯建模方法相补充，并扩大了可以研究的问题范围。这些模型所能提供的见解种类，以及它们所面临的方法论和技术挑战，大体上与传统方法相似。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Robustness in Mechanism Design and Contracting

This review summarizes a nascent body of theoretical research on design of incentives when the environment is not fully known to the designer and offers some general lessons from the work so far. These recent models based on uncertainty and robustness offer an additional set of tools in the toolkit, complementary to more traditional, fully Bayesian modeling approaches, and broaden the range of problems that can be studied. The kinds of insights that such models can offer, and the methodological and technical challenges that they confront, broadly parallel those of traditional approaches.

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来源期刊

Annual Review of Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

9.70

自引率

3.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Annual Review of Economics covers significant developments in the field of economics, including macroeconomics and money; microeconomics, including economic psychology; international economics; public finance; health economics; education; economic growth and technological change; economic development; social economics, including culture, institutions, social interaction, and networks; game theory, political economy, and social choice; and more.