{"title":"走,走,走?评估伊朗退出《不扩散核武器条约》的可能理由","authors":"Christopher P. Evans","doi":"10.1093/JCSL/KRAB001","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n The recent targeted strike resulting in the death of Qassem Soleimani has received extensive attention for its violations of international law by the US. However, one area that has not been considered following the 3 January 2020 attack is the possible consequences this may have for Iran's nuclear non-proliferation legal obligations. Iranian officials have previously alluded to the possibility of Iran withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 1968 following the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in May 2018 and re-imposition of targeted economic sanctions against Iran. This article considers whether Iran can withdraw from the NPT, thus freeing Iran from its legal commitments not to develop nuclear weapons. It revisits the withdrawal provisions found in Article X of the NPT and examines the invocation of the ‘extraordinary events’ clause by other states in relation to other instruments too. In light of this, the discussion considers whether Iran can legally withdraw from the NPT, before concluding with some thoughts as to whether it should in fact pursue this option.","PeriodicalId":43908,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2021-02-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JCSL/KRAB001","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Going, Going, Gone? Assessing Iran's Possible Grounds for Withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons\",\"authors\":\"Christopher P. Evans\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/JCSL/KRAB001\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n The recent targeted strike resulting in the death of Qassem Soleimani has received extensive attention for its violations of international law by the US. However, one area that has not been considered following the 3 January 2020 attack is the possible consequences this may have for Iran's nuclear non-proliferation legal obligations. Iranian officials have previously alluded to the possibility of Iran withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 1968 following the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in May 2018 and re-imposition of targeted economic sanctions against Iran. This article considers whether Iran can withdraw from the NPT, thus freeing Iran from its legal commitments not to develop nuclear weapons. It revisits the withdrawal provisions found in Article X of the NPT and examines the invocation of the ‘extraordinary events’ clause by other states in relation to other instruments too. In light of this, the discussion considers whether Iran can legally withdraw from the NPT, before concluding with some thoughts as to whether it should in fact pursue this option.\",\"PeriodicalId\":43908,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-02-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/JCSL/KRAB001\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/JCSL/KRAB001\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JCSL/KRAB001","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
Going, Going, Gone? Assessing Iran's Possible Grounds for Withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
The recent targeted strike resulting in the death of Qassem Soleimani has received extensive attention for its violations of international law by the US. However, one area that has not been considered following the 3 January 2020 attack is the possible consequences this may have for Iran's nuclear non-proliferation legal obligations. Iranian officials have previously alluded to the possibility of Iran withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 1968 following the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in May 2018 and re-imposition of targeted economic sanctions against Iran. This article considers whether Iran can withdraw from the NPT, thus freeing Iran from its legal commitments not to develop nuclear weapons. It revisits the withdrawal provisions found in Article X of the NPT and examines the invocation of the ‘extraordinary events’ clause by other states in relation to other instruments too. In light of this, the discussion considers whether Iran can legally withdraw from the NPT, before concluding with some thoughts as to whether it should in fact pursue this option.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Conflict & Security Law is a thrice yearly refereed journal aimed at academics, government officials, military lawyers and lawyers working in the area, as well as individuals interested in the areas of arms control law, the law of armed conflict (international humanitarian law) and collective security law. The Journal covers the whole spectrum of international law relating to armed conflict from the pre-conflict stage when the issues include those of arms control, disarmament, and conflict prevention and discussions of the legality of the resort to force, through to the outbreak of armed conflict when attention turns to the coverage of the conduct of military operations and the protection of non-combatants by international humanitarian law.