Constitutional Design of Electoral Governance in Federal States

Abstract This article explores the constitutional politics of electoral governance in federations by focusing on the role of election commissions, drawing mainly on examples from Asia. All democracies face the challenge of insulating electoral governance from interference and capture. Compared to unitary states, federations confront the additional dilemma of how to disperse authority over electoral governance across multiple orders of government. Federal democracies must decide whether electoral governance should be a matter for the center or the states. I argue that the basic choice is between what I will call the ‘unitary model’ and the ‘division of powers model.’ The main institution of electoral governance is the electoral management body or ‘EMB.’ In the unitary model, a central EMB administers both national and state-level elections. In the ‘division of powers model’, both a central and state-level EMBs exist, with the state commissions administering elections in the component units of the federation. In federal democracies generally, but especially in Asia, the allure of the unitary model has been strong. The article draws on the example of the Constituent Assembly in India to illustrate what is at stake in how federal constitutions allocate authority over electoral governance.