Stackelberg模型中的技术共享与竞争力

IF 4.4 1区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS
Junlong Chen, Zihan Wei, Jiali Liu, Xiaosong Zheng
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引用次数: 17

摘要

现有文献在技术共享(专利许可)契约方面取得了较大成果,但在寡头垄断模式的选择、创新主体的设置、产品异质性的考虑、生产成本等方面存在缺陷。本文旨在揭示Stackelberg市场中领导者和追随者在创新、技术共享和共享费用方面的竞争策略。为了实现这一目标,采用了三阶段序贯博弈方法。结果如下:首先,企业是利用创新还是共享技术,与创新的固定成本、创新收益和产品差异化有关。如果创新的固定成本过高,创新的回报过低,或者产品过于同质化,都会阻碍创新活动。相对较低的创新回报使得两家企业有可能进行共享。然而,由于创新的回报相对较高,只有高度的产品差异化才能保证技术共享。第二,最优共享费是动态的,随着创新收益的增加,呈现先上升后下降的趋势。产品差异化对成本有不确定的影响。第三,根据创新和产品差异化的回报,领导者或追随者可能是社会责任的最佳承担者。本研究对优化技术共享决策、提高企业竞争力、政府制定有效的产业政策具有理论意义。为具有技术创新行为的企业之间的竞争与合作提供了一定的实践指导。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Technology Sharing and Competitiveness in a Stackelberg Model
The existing literature has made great achievements in technology sharing (licensing patents) contracts, which has defects in the selection of oligopoly models, the setting of innovation subjects, the consideration of product heterogeneity, and production costs. This paper aims to reveal the competitiveness strategies of leaders and followers for innovation, technology sharing, and sharing fees in a Stackelberg market. The three-stage sequential game method is used to achieve the objective. The results are as follows. First, whether an enterprise uses innovation or shares technology is related to the fixed cost of innovation, the return on innovation, and product differentiation. It will hinder innovation activities if the fixed cost of innovation is too high, the return on innovation is too low, or the products are too homogeneous. A relatively low return on innovation makes it possible for the two enterprises to engage in sharing. However, with a relatively high return on innovation, only a high level of product differentiation can ensure technology sharing. Second, the optimal sharing fee is dynamic, showing an upward and then downward trend as the return on innovation grows. Product differentiation has an uncertain impact on the cost. Third, either the leader or the follower is likely to be the optimal bearer of social responsibility depending on the returns on innovation and product differentiation. This study has theoretical significance for optimizing technology-sharing decisions, improving competitiveness for enterprises, and formulating effective industrial policy for the government. And it provides some practical guidance for competition and cooperation between enterprises with technological innovation behavior.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
11.30
自引率
2.70%
发文量
33
审稿时长
12 weeks
期刊介绍: The Journal of Competitiveness, a scientific periodical published by the Faculty of Management and Economics of Tomas Bata University in Zlín in collaboration with publishing partners, presents the findings of basic and applied economic research conducted by both domestic and international scholars in the English language. Focusing on economics, finance, and management, the Journal of Competitiveness is dedicated to publishing original scientific articles. Published four times a year in both print and electronic formats, the journal follows a rigorous peer-review process with each contribution reviewed by two independent reviewers. Only scientific articles are considered for publication, while other types of papers such as informative articles, editorial materials, corrections, abstracts, or résumés are not included.
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